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Abstract
This thesis examines the relationship between a firm’s credit risk and its loan
characteristics in the context of Chinese listed firms. In particular, it focuses on the effect
of Chinaʹs new banking regulatory system on this relationship. It seeks to answer the
following questions: Does a collateralized loan imply higher default risk? Is the credit
risk markedly higher for borrowers with short‐term loans than for borrowers with
long‐term loans? Is the credit risk more closely related to loan term and collateral after
the implementation of the new banking regulatory system?

To answer the above questions, quantitative methods will be adopted. A modified
version of the logit models used in Estrella et al. (1998) is applied in this thesis. We
regress dependent variables of credit risk to a firm’s financial‐ratio variable,
macro‐economic variables and loan‐characteristic variables. The data set of this study is
all firms listed on the Shanghai stock exchange. To capture the effect of the new banking
regulatory system, we has selected the panel data from 2002‐2007 and introduced a
dummy variable that represents the enforcement of the new law into the model as an
explanatory variable.
After controlling for other variables, this research finds that the credit risk of a firm is
positively related to the proportion of collateralized loans, and negatively related to the
proportion of long‐term loans. It also found that the firm’s proportion of long‐term
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loans and the proportion of collateralized loans are increasingly and significantly
related to the firm’s credit risk as a consequence of the implementation of the new law.
This research suggests that the new banking regulatory system is changing the way that
banks design loan contracts.

Despite some limitations, the findings in this research make a significant contribution to
the research in this area. It adds empirical evidence to the current literature about the
relationship between a firm’s loan characteristics and credit risk as a consequence of the
implementation of China’s new banking regulatory law.
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CHAPTER ONE – Introduction and Overview

1.1 Introduction
This thesis examines the relationship between loan characteristics and credit risk for
Chinese listed firms. Credit risk has emerged as a central issue in finance over the last four
decades. Sophisticated systems to quantify and manage credit risk across different
institutional and a geographic settings, and product lines, have been introduced (Altman,
1998).Theories have been developed to explain the relationship between credit risk and
loan characteristics that is usually defined as collateral and loan term.

Diamond (1991) assumes that firms with private information about future profitability will
prefer to issue short‐term debt. Diamond argues, however, that short‐term borrowing also
exposes firms to the risk of excessive liquidations. Lenders are reluctant to refinance the
debt if bad news arrives. In Diamondʹs analysis, firms prefer long‐term debt to reduce this
refinancing risk. Firms with poor credit ratings, however, are unable to borrow long‐term
because of the extreme adverse‐selection costs. Thus, Diamond (1991) argues that a
borrower’s loan term structure can signal the borrower’s credit risk level.

There are also theoretical arguments regarding collateral and credit risk. Manove and
Padilla (1999) argue that more collateral implies higher credit risk or probability of default.
Firstly, if banks are protected by a high level of collateral they have less incentive to
adequately screen potential borrowers and loans at the time of the decision. Moreover,
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there are optimistic business persons who underestimate their chances of going bankrupt
and who are willing to provide all the collateral they are asked for in order to obtain
finance for their projects. The theory (Allen, 1990) also argues that more collateral can
imply higher credit risk, because in order to control the loss at given defaults banks require
observably risky borrowers to pledge collateral, while they don’t require same of safer
borrowers.

These theories present explanations for the relationship between collateral and loan term
structure and credit risk, and provide analysis of the determinants of interaction between
loan characteristics and credit risk. The existing literature has concentrated mostly on
developed markets especially the US and the UK.

However, little has been done to identify this relationship in emerging markets. An
investigation of this relationship in China is consequently interesting, and could provide
insights into assessing credit risk in developing countries in general. To the best of the
author’s knowledge, this study is the first to examine empirically the relationship between
listed firm’s loan characteristics and credit risk in an emerging market. It also contributes
the first effort to investigate the effect of new banking regulatory system on the interaction
between loan characteristics and credit risk.

1.2 Motivation for This Research
The first motivation for this research is the importance of credit risk .During the last 30
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years many models and theories have been introduced to estimate and predict default risk,
making credit risk one of the most interesting topics in modern corporate finance. The
theories and explanations that have emerged to assess and determine credit risk have
resulted in vast theoretical and empirical research studies. The large body of research that
has been carried out motivates the current research on credit risk.

The second motivation, also noted above briefly, is the scarcity of research into the
determinants of credit risk in emerging markets. Most of the empirical works have been
conducted in the US and have typically focused on firms in developed countries. Although
there are some studies about the determinants of credit risk in developing countries, they
are still very limited and not comprehensive. Also, there is an increasing awareness that
theories originating from developed countries may have limited applicability and need to
be tested in emerging markets. Emerging markets are different from developed markets in
many characteristics such as macro economy, banking regulatory system, accounting
information, law environment, and the financial systems in emerging markets, which is
commonly more bank‐based than in developed countries. Also, emerging markets have less
information efficiency, more volatility, and are smaller in size, which all limit the
application of developed markets’ empirical models (Altman, 1998).

Third motivation, evidence is currently very limited with regard to interaction between
loans characteristics and credit risk in the Chinese system. The existing studies (Xua, 2006)
have been based on small and, in some respects, biased samples consisting of non‐listed
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firms. This research is the first study that makes a comprehensive attempt to investigate the
relationship between credit risk and loan characteristics in the Chinese market using a
large‐scale data set of listed firms compiled by the author. The lack of previous studies on
the relationship between credit risk and loan characteristics in emerging markets, and in
particular China, provides strong motivation for this research.

Final motivation, although studies (Carling, 2007; Jimenez, 2004) have investigated the
relationship between loan characteristic and credit risk, none of these studies has
researched the influence of a changed banking regulatory system on this relationship.
Indeed, with strengthening financial supervision and regulation, China provides an
interesting environment for this relationship. In 2003, the China Banking Regulatory
Commission was established to monitor commercial‐bank behavior. In 2004, the Law of the
China Commercial Bank was revised by the China Congress (2004), while the Guidelines on
Due Diligence in the Credit Extension Work of Commercial Banks (CBRC, 2004, no.19) were
issued by the newly established China Banking Regulatory Commission. The Law and
Guidelines stipulated that the banks have to make judgments regarding customer loan
issues such as collateral and the term of the loan based on the customer’s credit risk level.
Consequently, borrowers with high credit risk must provide collateral in order to access a
short‐term loan. The revised law and new guidelines have therefore already had an impact
on the relationship between the credit risk of borrowers and their loan characteristics. The
changed banking regulatory system makes China an exceptional case study.
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1.3 Objectives and Importance
This research aims to examine the relationship between credit risk and loan characteristics
for the Chinese firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. This is the first attempt to
examine this relationship for Chinese listed firms, including all firms listed on the Shanghai
Stock Exchange over the period 2002‐2007. By including all listed firms, the study is more
comprehensive and provides more valuable results.

The second objective of the thesis is to provide a comprehensive study of the factors that
affect credit risk using firm‐specific and macroeconomic variables in China, as an example
of a developing country. As emerging markets are different from developed markets, so
the variables that affect credit risk in emerging markets could be different from the ones
that operate in developed markets. Therefore, this study will provide a useful test of
whether the theories that have been established and applied in developed markets are
applicable to emerging markets. Also, its findings could provide a useful template for
future comparative research based on other emerging markets and developed market.
Moreover, determining the variables that affect credit risk will help financial institutions
make decisions on investment, and provide investors with an early warning on whether
they need to take corrective action to control credit risk.

Third, the objective of the research is to investigate the effect of the new banking regulatory
system on the relationship between loan characteristics and credit risk, since it was
instituted in 2004. This is the first attempt to include a banking regulatory variable in
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determining the relationship between credit risk and loan characteristics.

Fourth, this thesis attempts to show the current state of the literature and the main
contributions to that literature, which could be used as a source of reference for future
research about the interaction between loan characteristics and credit risk.

Finally, based on the findings of this research, this thesis attempts to provide suggestions
and recommendations for future research in both emerging and developed markets.

1.4 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is presented in seven chapters. The main structure of each chapter is as follows:
Chapter 1 introduces an overview of the research topic, motivation, objectives and
importance of the thesis. It provides a general introduction about the relationship between
loan characteristics and credit risk, and the motivation for the thesis. It is established in
Chapter 1 that the study was motivated by (1) the importance of credit‐risk study in
corporate finance, (2) the lack of detailed evidence about the relationship between loan
characteristics and credit risk in emerging markets, and more specifically in China, the
worldʹs largest emerging market, ; (3) lack of evidence about the effect of the change of
Chinaʹs banking regulatory system on the relationship between loan characteristics and
credit risk, and (4) the particular scarcity of studies on Chinese listed firms.

Chapter 2 covers the theoretical considerations and relevant prior research on credit risk. It
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begins by presenting a general introduction on the topic, and reviews the historical
research into credit risk. The chapter then presents the basic arguments of loan term,
collateral, macro economic, and accounting information theories, and presents empirical
evidence on credit risk.

This chapter also provides an overview and analysis of the evolution of the theoretical
consideration of credit risk. It discusses loan term theory‐ including Diamondʹs contention
(1991) argues that borrowersʹ loan‐term structure can signal their credit risk level. It
presents the theory (Allen, 1990) that more collateral implies higher credit risk. Chapter 2
also discusses the theoretical links between macroeconomic variables and credit risk.
Fridson et al. (1997), Ferri (2002) and Barnhill and Maxwell (2002) argue that
macroeconomic conditions can have impact on credit risk.

Chapter 2 also shows the empirical evidence for the theories presented in the thesis,
reviewing the empirical studies on the determinants of credit risk such as account
information, macro economic factors and loan characteristics.

Chapter 3 provides an overview of the Chinese banking reform and the potential
implication for credit risk in China. It outlines the changes in the banking regulatory
system. The new banking regulatory authority (CBRC) was established in 2003 and its
supervisory functions were strengthened compared with prior regulatory authority (PBC).
CBRC issued a series of guidelines to prompt banking institutions to improve the credit
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risk management skill. Carcia‐Herrero (2006) points out that these issued guidelines and
strict inspection and disciplinary action affect the bank credit policy and improve their
credit risk management skill. It implies that the relationship between credit risk and loan
characteristics is strengthened with the enforcement of new guidelines.

Following from the theories presented in Chapter 2, two hypotheses on the relationship
between credit risk and loan characteristics are made in Chapter 4. Hypothesis 1 (H1):
states that borrowers with a higher proportion of collateralized loan in their total loan have
a higher credit risk, and Hypothesis 2 (H2): states that a borrower’s proportion of
long‐term loan is significantly and negatively related to the credit risk of the borrower.
According to Chinese special situation presented in Chapter 3, Hypothesis 3 (H3): states
that the relationship between loan characteristics and the borrowerʹs credit risk is closer
since the implementation of the new banking regulatory law and guidelines in 2004.

In response to the investigation and examination of the hypotheses made in Chapter 4,
Chapter 5 presents the quantitative methods used for the current study. This research
follows Estrella (1998) in applying logit models to credit risk. The credit risk is defined as
dependent

variables,

macro‐economic

variables,

accounting

variables

and

loan‐characteristics variables are incorporated into the model as explanatory variables.
Prior studies (Manave et al., 1999; Carling, 2007) are extended by introducing the year as a
dummy variable into the model to capture the impact, if any, of the banking regulatory
change.
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In Chapter 5, two variables are developed to measure the loan characteristics of companies.
The first variable is the proportion of a firm’s total loan that is collateralized. The second
variable is the proportion of a firm’s total loan that is classified as long term, where
long‐term loans have a maturity of more than one year (Sharpe, 1990).

The Chapter 6 then presents the empirical results and discusses the impact of loan
characteristics on credit risk in the Chinese context. This chapter answers the question of
whether the hypotheses are supported by the Chinese evidence. Chapter 7 provides a
summary of the thesis, limitations, implications and recommendations for future research.
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CHAPTER TWO ‐ Literature Review
2.1 Introduction.
The corporate sector plays an important role in the performance and development of the
real economy. The relationship of the corporate sector to the banking sector and to the
financial markets is crucial to the stability of the financial system. The financial system is
considered to be the main part of the economic system that expedites economic
transactions and commercial expansion. Facilitating lending and payment activities are the
core activities of the financial system, and these necessarily involve risk. Credit risk has
become a more and more important issue in finance as a result of commercial expansion
and an increasing number of defaulted firms (Altman, 1998). Predicting the potential credit
risk of business at an early stage and providing an early warning for investors could help
to reduce the losses.

The term ʺcredit riskʺ is defined as the risk that a counterparty will not settle an obligation
for full value, either when due or at any time thereafter (Altman, 1968). Shumway (2001)
declares that the failure to meet the obligation may arise from lending activities, investing
activities or buying and selling financial assets on behalf of others. Therefore, appropriate
treatment of these exposures is very important for both bank and company. Maximising a
firm’s value and decreasing the likelihood of default are principal tasks for managers.

The oldest form of risk in the financial markets is credit risk, also known as default risk.
The study of credit risk has captured the attention of both academics and industry
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participants. They have attempted to interpret several issues related to default risk and
formulate theories and models to explain and calculate corporate default risk (Altman,
1968, 1998).

Credit risk has been a continuing issue in finance. After more than 40 years of research
there is still no comprehensive conclusion that considers all the macro and micro variables
that determining a firm’s credit risk in an emerging market. This thesis makes a small
contribution to this important topic by considering different theories of the determinants of
credit risk. This study considers theories concerning loan loan‐term structure, and
collateral, and further considers the impact of macroeconomic variables.

This chapter outlines the main theories of what determines a firm’s credit risk, and reviews
the main empirical studies on credit risk. Accounting information was the factor studied in
the earliest credit risk studies. Subsequent studies looked at loan‐contract information,
(such as collateral, loan‐term structure), then macro economic factors and finally, legal
environment as the relevant factors in determining borrowersʹ the credit risk (Altman,
1998). In order to present credit risk or default risk in a systematic and logical way, this
chapter is organized according to the history of credit‐risk research. The literature review is
structured as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the literatures on the relationship between credit
risk and accounting information. Section 2.3 presents the literatures on the impact of
collateral on credit risk. Section 2.4 outlines the literatures on the interaction between
loan‐term structure and credit risk. Section 2.5 reviews the literature on the impact of
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macro –economic factors on credit risk. Section 2.6 describes the literature on the impact of
a new legal environment on credit risk. Section 2.7 summarizes similar research in China.
Section 2.8 summarizes the chapter and includes a discussion of the implications of the
literature for the research undertaken in the thesis.

2.2 Credit risk and accounting information
The relationship between firms’ credit risk and their accounting information has
accumulated a substantial number of studies. These studies can be classified into two
classifications: Expert those that primarily consider expert systems and those that
primarily look at credit risk using the accounting‐information model.

2.2.1 Expert system based on banker subjective analysis.
Altman (1998) states that most financial institutions relied virtually exclusively on
subjective analysis, or so‐called banker “expert” systems, to assess the credit risk on
corporate loans before 1980s. Essentially, bankers used information on various borrower
characteristics such as borrower character (reputation), capital (leverage), capacity
(volatility of earnings) and collateral, which is called “the four Cs of credit” , to reach a
largely subjective judgment ( in effect, that of an expert) as to whether or not to grant
credit(Altman, 1998). Sommerville and Taffler (1995) show that multivariate credit‐scoring
systems (see below) tend to outperform the expert systems. Altman (1998) also points out
those financial institutions themselves have increasingly (and not‐ surprisingly) moved
away from subjective/expert systems since 1980s towards systems that are more objective.
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2.2.2 Credit–scoring and bankruptcy prediction models on the base of accounting
information.

In studies of credit risk scoring system, there are two approaches, one is univariate
accounting based credit‐scoring system, and the other is multivariate accounting based
credit‐scoring system. In univariate accounting based credit‐scoring system, the FI
(finance institution) decision‐maker compares various key accounting ratios of potential
borrowers with industry or group norms (Barney, 1999; Fenfterstock, 2003).When using
multivariate models, the key accounting variables are combined and weighted to produce
either a credit risk score or a probability of default measure. If the credit risk score, or
probability, attains a value above a critical benchmark, a loan applicant is either rejected or
subjected to increased security (Barney, 1999).

Since 1980s, a lot of literatures developed and tested multivariate credit‐scoring models.
In these literatures, international models have been developed in over 25 countries
(Altman et al, 1997).

There are at least four methodological approaches to developing multivariate
credit‐scoring systems: (i) the linear probability model, (ii) the logit model, (iii) the probit
model, and (iv) the discriminant analysis model (Altman, 1998). By far the dominant
methodologies, in these literatures, have been discriminant analysis followed by logit
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analysis (Altman, 1998). Altman et al. (1977) developed the now commonly used and
referenced ZETA discriminant model. Stripped to its bare essentials, the most common
form of discriminant analysis seeks to find a linear function of accounting and market
variables

that

best

distinguishes

between

two

loan

borrower

classification

groups‐repayment and non‐repayment. This requires an analysis of a set of variables to
maximize the between group variance while minimizing the within group variance among
these variables. Similarly, logit analysis uses a set of accounting variables to predict the
probability of borrower default, assuming that the probability of default is logistically
distributed i.e., the cumulative probability of default takes a logistic functional form and is,
by definition, constrained to fall between 0 and 1.

Martin (1977) used both logit and discriminant analysis to predict bank failures in
1975‐1976 period, when 23 banks failed. Both models gave similar classifications in terms of
identifying failures/non‐failures. Morsman (1986) used the logit model (along with factor
analysis) to measure the financial condition of financial institution and to assign to them a
probability of being a problem bank. In this research, they found that the factors identified
by the logit model are similar to the CAMEL rating components used by bank examiners.
Platt and Platt (1991) use the logit model to test whether industry relative accounting ratios,
rather than simple firm specific accounting ratios, are better predictors of corporate
bankruptcy. In general, the industry relative accounting ratio model performed better than
the unadjusted model. Lawrence et al. (1992) use the logit model to predict the probability
of default on mobile home loans. They find that payment history is by far the most
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important predictor of default. Smith and Lawrence (1995) use a logit model to find the
variables that offer the best prediction of a loan moving into a default state.

Finally, as noted earlier, by far the largest number of multivariate accounting based
credit‐scoring models have been based on discriminant analysis models (Altman, 1998).
Altman et al. (1977) investigate the predictive performance of a seven variable discriminant
analysis model (that includes the market value of equity as one variable). A private firm
version of this model also exists. In general, the seven variable model ‐ the so‐called “Zeta
model” ‐ is shown to improve upon Altmanʹs (Altman, 1968) earlier five variable model.
Also, Scott (1981) compares a number of these empirical models with a theoretically sound
approach. He concludes that the ZETA model most closely approximates his theoretical
bankruptcy construct.

Although multivariate credit‐scoring models have been used widely in the world, they
attract some criticisms. Altman (1998) pointed out that although “in many cases
multivariate accounting based credit‐scoring model has been shown to perform quite well
over many different time periods and across many different countries, they have been
subject to at least three criticisms”. He outlines criticisms as followings. First, the above
models are on the based of book value accounting data (which in turn is measured at
discrete intervals), these models may fail to reflect the changes of borrower conditions.
Second, the world phenomena isnot always linked linearly, so linear discriminate analysis
and the linear probability models may fail to forecast as accurately as those that relax the
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underlying assumption of linearity among explanatory variables. Third, there is no strong
link between the above credit‐scoring bankruptcy prediction models and an underlying
theoretical model.

As these criticisms, some literatures present new approach as alternatives to traditional
accounting information models. For example, Wilcox (1973), Scott (1981), Santomero and
Vinso (1977) developed “risk of ruin” models; Altman (1988, 1989) developed the mortality
rate model.

2.3 Credit risk and collateral
2.3.1 Two paradigms on the relationship between credit risk and collateral
It is common idea that the banking community associates the use of collateral with
observably riskier borrowers. As part of every pre‐loan credit analysis, commercial lenders
assess the riskiness of prospective borrowers and base the collateral requirements at least
in part on this assessment. Hempel, Coleman, and Simonson (1986, p391) observe that
large prime borrowers are more likely to get unsecured financing “because they tend to
have stronger equity support in their capital structures, more stable cash flows, and more
certain investment opportunities”. In the case of seasonal loan facilities, Morsman (1986, p5)
notes that banks are “normally secured by a perfected security interest in accounts
receivable,

inventory,

and

equipment”.

However,

“exceptions

can

occur

with

well‐capitalized companies with no other types of debt and a history of seasonal payout”
(Morsman, 1986, p5). In other words, observably risky borrowers are required to pledge
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collateral, while observably safe borrowers are not. Allen (1990) refers to it as the
sorting‐by‐observed‐risk paradigm.

Some other theoretical also studies support the sorting‐by‐observed‐risk paradigm. In Boot,
Thakor, and Udell (1988), an exogenous quality dimension of the borrower’s project is
observable to both borrower and lender, while borrower effort is privately known. They
find that under certain conditions, collateral is pledged by borrowers with observably
higher risk.

In contrast to the sorting‐by‐observed‐risk paradigm, much of the theoretical literature
focuses on private information known only to borrowers and draws a different conclusion
about the relationship between borrower risk and collateral. Besanko and Thakor (1987a)
find that in a market where lenders are at an informational disadvantage with respect to
borrower default probabilities, collateral may mitigate a credit‐rationing problem. In
equilibrium, low‐risk borrowers pledge more collateral than high‐risk borrowers. In
another paper, Besanko and Thakor (1987b) find a similar positive relationship between
collateral and borrower risk. This latter paper examines loan contracting under asymmetric
information when the pricing menu has a number of dimensions, including loan quantity,
interest rate, collateral, and potential rationing. Chan and Kanatas (1985) and Bester (1985)
find that collateral can produce sorting across borrower types when collateralization is
costly. Both papers find that low‐risk borrowers pledge more collateral than high‐risk
borrowers because collateral‐associated costs produce different marginal rates of
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substitution. Allen (1990) refers to the view represented by these four papers which find a
relationship between collateral and borrower risk as the sorting‐by‐private information
paradigm.

The theory (Manove and Padilla, 1999) also point out that collateral can imply higher credit
risk, because on one hand when banks are protected by a high level of collateral they have
less incentive to undertake adequate screening of potential borrowers and loans at the time
of the decision, on the other hand, there are optimistic business persons who underestimate
their chances of going bankrupt and who are willing to provide all the collateral they are
asked for in order to obtain finance for their projects.

2.3.2 Empirical evidence
Some empirical studies test the above theories in the context of developed and developing
economies, which yields contrasting results.

Orgler (1970) and Hester (1979) made empirical studies of the relationship between
collateral and risk by American evidence. Orgler (1970) compiled a data base on individual
loans from bank examination files and distinguished ‘good’ from ‘bad’ loans on the basis of
whether the loans were ultimately “criticized” by the Bank examiners. He regressed a
good‐bad dummy variable on a secured‐unsecured dummy variable and several control
variables and found secured loans to be riskier, but the coefficient was significant only at
the 10% level. Hester used data from a 1972 survey which included loan contract terms and
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limited information on the borrowers. He regress a secured‐unsecured dummy variable on
six accounting ratios that proxy risk, a Dun and Bradstreet credit‐rating dummy, and
numerous control variables. The coefficients show that riskier borrowers pledge collateral.

By American evidence, Allen et al (1990) test whether secured borrowers and secured loans
are riskier or safer, respectively, than unsecured borrowers and unsecured loans .In the
cross‐section, they relate an ex ante measure of loan risk to collateral. The cross‐section
dependent variable is the loan risk premium, the difference between the loan rate and a
risk‐free rate of the same duration. The primary data source for the cross‐section is the
Federal Reserve’s Survey of Terms of Bank Lending, which contains information on over
one million business loans. The sample includes the 48 largest banks in the nation plus 292
other banks chosen to represent the strata of smaller banks. Empirical evidence presented
strongly suggests that collateral is most often associated with riskier borrowers, riskier
loans, and riskier banks.

Jimenez et al (2004) analyses the determinants of the probability of default (PD) of bank
loans. The study uses information on the more than three million loans entered into by
Spanish credit institutions over a complete business cycle (1988–2000) collected by the Bank
of Spain’s Credit Register (Central de Informaci_on de Riesgos). After controlling for other
explanatory variables, they find that collateralized loans have a higher PD.

Some other empirical evidence also shows the difference with above. For a UK sample of
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bank loans to small and medium‐sized enterprises, Cressy and Toivanen (2001) did not
find a significant relationship between the default and the incidence of collateral.

Up to now no much evidence is from the developing countries. The only empirical study is
from Thailand. Lukas, et al (2005) examines the role and determinants of collateral in
emerging markets compared to mature ones by Thai evidence. Analyzing a data set of 560
credit files of Thai commercial banks, they find that the credit risk of small and relatively
young firms is associated with collateral.

2.4 Credit risk and loan term structure
2.4.1 Theoretical studies
Diamond (1991) point out that credit risk has a relationship with loan maturity choice.
Insiders have superior information about a firm’s prospects and, consequently, its credit
risk. In Diamond’s (1991) theoretical model, this has both positive and negative effects on
the choice of short‐term debt over long term debt. Using short‐term debt financing allows
the debt’s interest rate to be reduced at refinancing as positive information is revealed.
However, using short‐term debt also exposes a firm to refinancing risk‐if the revealed
information is negative, lenders might not refinance‐thus, forcing a firm into premature
liquidation. Furthermore, if a firm finances with long –term debt, then investors will
require high interest rates for bearing the long‐term credit risk of high‐ default‐ risk firms.
These high rates might then cause a firm to choose very‐high‐risk projects. This is a classic
adverse selection problem (Diamond, 1991)
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Diamond’s (1991) model predicts a relation between credit risk and debt maturity. Very
risky firms have to borrow short‐term loan; no one will lend to them long term‐loan
because of the resulting adverse selection problem. The firms with less credit risk have
more long‐term borrowings.

Guedes and Opler (1996) argue that low risk firms borrow short term and long‐term debt
while high risk firms borrow at the intermediate term, a result that appears to conflict with
Diamond (1991).

2.4. 2 Empirical studies
Some empirical papers test the relationship between the borrower’s credit risk and debt
maturity: Barclay and Smith (1995); Stohs and Mauer (1996); and Guedes and Opler (1996).
Their studies use a large firm sample of American firms. The samples are selected in
different ways and measure debt maturity differently.

Barclay and Smith (1995) use a sample of firms from the Compustat and CRSP tapes
comprising 39949 firm‐year observations of 5545 traded industrial firms, with data taken
from 1974 through 1992. Their primary measure of debt maturity is the proportion of total
debt with a maturity greater than three years.

Stohs and Mauer (1996) use a measure of weighted‐average debt maturity. Their data
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requirements limit the sample to 328 firms, all large and publicly traded, in various
industries. Their sample period is 1980‐1989.

Guedes and Opler (1996) examine the determinants of the maturity of new public debt
issues rather than existing issues. Their new issues took place between 1983 and 1972; 7369
corporate issues comprise the sample.

All above studies use credit rating as measure of credit risk; all find a significant relation
with debt maturity. The findings of Barclay and Smith (1995) and Stohs and Mauer (1996)
support the relationship postulated in Diamond’s (1991) model. Guedes and Opler (1996)
find that firms with high credit rating issue shorter‐term straight (nonconvertible) debt than
do firms with speculative‐grade ratings.

Scherr et al (2001) argue that small firms differs from large firms in taxability, ownership,
flexibility, industry, economies of sale, financial market access, and level of information
asymmetry. Using data from 1987 and 1993 versions of National Survey of small Business
Finances (NSSBF) database, they investigate the relationship between credit risk of small
firms and their maturity structure. They find that small firm’s maturity structure is
statistically related to its credit risk.

John et al (2008) examine the relationship between the small firms’ credit risk and their loan
characteristics. In their study firm with restatement is defined as high credit risk firm.
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Using misreporting data from the financial restatement database collected by the U.S.
General Accounting Office (Gao), they investigate the relationship between restatement
firm and their loan characteristics. They find that compared with loans initiated before
restatement, loans initiated after restatement have significantly higher spreads, shorter
maturities, higher likelihood of being secured, and more covenant restrictions. These results
are consistent with banks using tighter loan contract terms to overcome risk and
information problems arising from financial restatements of borrowers.

2.5 Credit risk and macro economic factors
2.5.1 Empirical studies
Some researchers, such as Saunders (1997), Asarnow (1996), Crouhy, Galai, and Mark (2000),
as well as Carty and Fons (1993), have determined that the range of the credit risk of an
individual investment (e. g. loan) is influenced by risk factors, which can be divided into
those influencing the risk of all investments and causing investment’s systematic credit risk
and those influencing the risk of an individual investment and causing investment’s
unsystematic credit risk. These factors influencing the systematic credit risk are
macroeconomic factors, changes in economic policies, political changes and the goals of
leading political parties. In these literatures, macroeconomic factors include the inflation
rate, the employment rate, growth in gross domestic product, stock index and exchange
rate movements, and conjuncture fluctuations in the economy. Changes in economic
policies are represented by changes in monetary and tax policies, economic legislation
changes, as well as import restrictions and export stimulation (Saunders, 1997). The factors
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influencing the unsystematic credit risk are primarily the factors of individual customers,
such as their personality, their financial solvency and capital, credit insurance and general
terms and conditions.

Crouhy, Galai, and Mark (2000) suggest that actual default probabilities of companies vary
over time, depending on the state of economy. They make the statistics on the firm default
and world economy development from 1985 to 1997. They found that in 1990 and 1991,
when the world economy was in recession, the frequency of firm defaults rose
substantially. On the other hand, during the period after 1991, which was characterized by
a growing economy, the number of defaults declined. Using the data from 1971 to 2003,
Hashem (2006) shows the apparent relationship between credit risk and macro economy
change. The economic downturn in the year 2001‐2002 corresponded to significant
increases in default rates as compared to low default rate experienced during the
1993‐1998 boom period. Other studies also examine the relationship between historical
default rates and macroeconomic conditions. Fama (1986) and Wilson (1997a) find that
default rates increases when the economy turns down, whereas Carey (1998) documents
significant differences in default rates for “good” years as compared to “bad years”.

However, Koopman and Lucas (2003) find some ambiguity in the relationship between
credit risk and macroeconomic conditions. Using a long‐time series ranging from 1929 to
2002 and assuming that the U.S. business failure rate is an empirical proxy for default risk,
they find evidence supporting the consensus finding of a contemporaneous negative
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correlation between real GDP and default risk. However, the long run, dynamic analysis
rejects this finding, suggesting that credit spreads influence default rates and real GDP, but
not vice versa.

Hillegeist,

et

al.(2004)

compare

accounting‐based

credit

risk

measurement

models(Altman’s Z‐score and Olson’s O‐score) to the market‐based options pricing model
of default risk and find that addition of macro economy factors (in this case, equity prices)
significantly improves explanatory power, thereby indicating the presence of macro
economy risk factors in default probabilities. Bongini et al. (2002) obtain similar results
when comparing accounting data, stock prices and credit ratings as indicators of bank
fragility.

2.5.2 Theoretical approach
Several studies use the structural, options‐theoretic approach to estimating the credit risk
conditional on macroeconomic factors. Fridson et al (1997), Ferri (2002), Barnhill and
Maxwell (2002) argue a relationship between macroeconomic conditions and credit risk. In
particular, they find positive correlations between credit risk and various systematic
components (such as, interest rates, the S&P500, or cyclical factors across regional
portfolios including the United States, European Union, Asia‐Pacific and Latin America.)

Tom Wilson and Mc.Kinsey and Company (Paul‐Choudhury, 1998) develops Credit
Portfolio View, a multifactor model for credit risk measurement, which can be useful for
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generating the distribution of default probabilities and credit rating migration probabilities
for different industry sectors and for each individual country. In their study (Wilson et al,
1997b), Credit Portfolio View takes into account that default probabilities and probabilities
of obligor credit rating migrations depend on the state of the economy. When the economy
is in recession, the probability of default of companies and credit downgrades increase,
and vice versa when the economy is strong (Belkin, Suchower, and Forest, 1998). Slower
economic growth thus causes more frequent higher credit risk, with lower credit risk
classes having a higher correlation with macroeconomic factors. Credit risk during the
time of economic recession and expansion is clearly illustrated by Wilson (1997b).

According to Credit Metrics technical document (JP Morgan, 1997), firm credit risk may
also be influenced by some macroeconomic factors, which is reflected in the changes in
interest rates, stock index, exchange rates and unemployment level. The probability of
default of a firm is thus related to the market risk which result from the change of macro
economy. JP Morgan (1997) points out that the ideal methodological tool for bank risk
measurement should therefore link market risk, which banks are exposed to in their
operations.

2.6 Credit risk and legal environment
From 1980s, some literatures started to concentrate on the relationship between the credit
risk of borrowers and new regulatory law enforcement. In these empirical studies, most
evidence is on the impact of Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 on borrower’s credit risk in
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America. The typical approach was to estimate the parameters of borrower’s bankruptcy
outcomes for period prior to the law enforcement and then project bankruptcies into the
subsequent period. The parameters of bankruptcy difference were interpreted to be the
result of intervention in the new legal environment. The models underlying these
projections vary in degree of sophistication and attention to stochastic properties of data
(Nelson, 2000).

Carter (1982) examines the annual trend in filing for 1959‐1979 and 1980. This study
concludes that as much as three‐fourths of the raise of borrower bankruptcies in that period
maybe due to Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 enforcement. Bhandari, et al (1983) conducts
another study by using quarterly data from 1958:1 through 1982:3. A large number of
possible explanatory variables (22 in all) were examined. A dummy variable for the new
law change indicated that the Code may have contributed no more than an estimated 6% to
7% of the total adjusted filings and 12% to 14% of the total number of debtors for fiscal
years 1980, 1981 and 1982 (Bhandari, et al, 1983).

Boyes and Faith(1986) show the another evidence by using an ARIMA intervention model
to study monthly bankruptcy petitions in U.S. District Court located in Phoenix, Arizona.
The study period is January 1976 through Dec.1981. The study indicated that the permanent
effect of the code was about 43 more bankruptcies per month or an increase of 21.6% over
the trend. The authors conclude “that effect of the implementation of the new law was to
increase substantially the number of bankruptcies” (Boyes and Faith, 1986, p147).
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Nelson (2000), Bhandari and Weiss (1993) notice that the above studies only examined the
impact of code in the first years of its implementation, and none extended the data past
1982. Therefore, it isnot clear from this work whether the impact of 1978 act was temporary
or permanent. Nelson (2000) point out that it may be that many attorneys delayed the filing
of new petitions in early 1979 to take advantage of higher exemptions available after
October 1979. This would show up as a temporary decrease in filings in 1979 followed by a
temporary increase in 1980‐1981. To cover the gap existed in above studies, Bhandari and
Weiss (1993) examined the impact of the new code over longer periods. They examined
borrower bankruptcy rates using annual data for the period 1947‐1987. The borrower
bankruptcy rates are regressed on the debt‐income ratio, unemployment rate, and a
dummy variable for the new code. The estimates are corrected for autocorrelation, but
Durbin‐Watson statistics are not reported. The code dummy is statistically insignificant,
leading them to conclude that “the enactment of the code in 1978 didn’t not have an
appreciable impact on the number of borrowers bankruptcy cases field” (Bhandari and
Weiss, 1993).However, they failed to adjust the data for reporting change due to joint
petitions and didn’t test for stationary of the data series. (Nelson, 2000).

Nelson (2000) point out that insufficient attention is paid to the stochastic properties of the
data and seasonality in quarterly data series, while all above studies attempted to correct
the estimates for first‐order autocorrelation. None of the studies using quarterly data
conducted tested for unit root or fourth‐order autocorrelation. Nelson (2000) also noticed
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that none of studies directly tested for temporary versus permanent effects of the Act. To
cover the above gap, Nelson (2000) examines the data on quarterly consumer filings and
rates using an ARIMA intervention model. The test is conducted for seasonal and non
seasonal unit roots. The sample period is from 1960:3 to 1995:4. Nelson (2000) study
indicated that the 1978 act increased borrower bankruptcies by 36%, in the post‐act period
relative to the pre‐act period, or about 72400 additional bankruptcies per year. Overall, the
net impact of the 1978 act was modest compared the substantial rise in bankruptcies that
has occurred since 1979.

2.7 Credit risk studies in China
In the past ten years, there has been some research on Chinese firmsʹ credit risk. Some logit
models have been used to explain the default risk of non‐listed companies using firm‐
specific factors, such as financial ratio, and industry information (Wang, 1998; Wei, 2007). In
these researches, the relationship between borrowersʹ credit risk and accounting information
was explored using Chinese empirical evidence. These researches suggest that the
borrowersʹ credit risk can be explained well by their accounting information. The evidence
also shows that logit‐model incorporated financial ratio has a strong explanatory power for
Chinese non‐listed companies’ credit risk (Wei, 2007). Some other models have also been
developed to predict the default risk. Tang (2005) used Bayesʹ model to predict the
short‐term loan credit risk. Xu (2006) built a credit‐risk assessment model based on
decision‐tree C4.5 algorithm. The model concluded that whether borrowers break the loan
contract depends on their financial ratio. Other research has applied a main‐component
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analysis method in credit‐risk modeling for non‐listed firms, the evidence shows that some
financial ratios are related to non‐listed firmsʹ credit risk (Li, 2005; Jiao, 2006).

2.8 Summary of the chapter
The literature on credit risk has produced a large body of theoretical and empirical work.
This chapter began with an overview of the accounting information model of credit risk. It
was noted that Altman (1968) Model can predict credit risk well. The chapter also presented
Allenʹs basic theory argument (1990) regarding how collateral can affect credit risk. The
chapter then presented the Diamondʹs theory (1991) on the relationship between loan term
and credit risk, and showed how the loan‐term structure could predict credit risk. The
chapter then discussed the role of macroeconomic variables. Lastly, the chapter discussed
the impact of the legal environment and similar studies in China. In order to provide a better
understanding, the chapter attempted to explain the basic argument for each theory
followed by the important empirical evidence.

Although numerous studies have examined various issues of a firm’s credit risk, they
concentrate on one issue such as accounting information, collateral, loan term, or
macroeconomic variables, rather than both micro and macroeconomic variables. We also
observed that most of the theories and studies are conducted in developed countries. The
evidence in relation to emerging markets is often very limited. Nevertheless, more recently,
there has been a growing interest in examining the determinants of a firm’s credit risk in an
emerging market. In spite of these efforts, so far there has been no comprehensive work that
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has investigated the relationship between credit risk and loan characteristics and evaluated
the influence of changes in the banking regulatory system on this relationship in emerging
market. Indeed, the strengthening of financial supervision and regulation in China provides
an interesting research environment for this question. Consequently, this objective of this
research is to cover the gap in the literature from a Chinese perspective.

The theoretical and empirical research discussed in this chapter has established that a range
of possible factors that can influence credit risk. The next chapter considers the reform of the
Chinese banking industry and the changes to the banking regulatory system, these
considerations will be used to formulate the research hypothesis in Chapter Four.
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CHAPTER THREE –Institutional Background

3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter outlined the theoretical consideration of credit risk and related
empirical studies, the factors that determine the default of borrowers, and some of the gaps
in the existing body of knowledge. The main objective of the current chapter is to discuss
the reform of the Chinese banking industry. Furthermore, this chapter presents the changes
in the banking regulatory system that will be used in the analysis of the relationship
between loan characteristics and credit risk in China. In other words, this chapter shows
the main characteristics of the Chinese banking system that may affect the relationship
between loan characteristics and credit risk.

The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief overview
of the Chinese banking industry. Section 3.3 discusses the reform of Chinese banking
system. Section 3.4 presents the reform of banking regulatory system. Section 3.5
summarizes the chapter.

3.2 The Chinese banking system
The reform of Chinese banking and its regulatory system started with an institutional
shake‐up, as is generally the case in transition economies (Ferri, 2009). The first and most
important step was the replacement in 1984, of a mono‐bank system with a multi‐tiered
one, in which central banking functions were separated from the rest. The second was the
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establishment of new commercial banks and policy banks. In this step, commercial banking
activities were separated from those specially geared towards economic development,
policy lending banks were established in 1994 in order to take over from Big – Four bank
projects for development purposes, new joint‐equity banks and city commercial banks
were established, and a new Commercial Banking law was approved in 1995 to regulate
commercial banks ((Wang, 2008). Third, the institutional design of the People’s Bank of
China (PBC) was strengthened through a new charter in 1995, in which it was given three
main responsibilities: monetary stability, banking supervision and oversight of the
payments system. The new charter, however, didn’t grant the PBC independence from the
State Council. Finally, responsibilities for monetary policy and banking supervision were
separated with the creation of the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) in 2003
(Carcia‐Herrero, 2006).

3.3 The reform of the Chinese banking system
3.3.1 Mono‐bank system was replaced by two‐tiered banking system
Prior to 1978, the Chinese financial system followed a mono‐bank model (People’s Bank of
China) whereby all the country’s banks were part of one administrative hierarchy. In 1978
banking reform was put on the agenda. The initial reform measures focused on modifying
the structure and operations of China’s banking system. Specifically, bank credit gradually
replaced state‐owned enterprises’ budgetary allocations, banks were expected to become
more profit‐oriented, a two‐tiered banking system replaced the mono‐bank system, and
various banking functions were devolved from the People’s Bank of China(Wang, 2008).
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This last measure resulted in four specialized state‐owned banks, the Bank of China (BOC),
the Agriculture Bank of China (ABC), the Construction Bank of China (CBC), and the
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the so‐called ‘‘Big Four”. In 1985
additional changes were implemented that were designed to give these institutions greater
scope in raising and allocating capital. The four banks are now national commercial banks
that compete with each other (Wang, 2008).

3.3.2 The establishment of Chinese Policy Bank, joint‐equity bank and other types of
bank
To increase competition in the banking sector, the Chinese government established new
banks, known as policy banks, joint‐equity banks， and city commercial banks.

In 1994, the government established three specialized ‘‘policy” banks, the Agricultural
Development Bank of China (ADBC), China Development Bank (CDB), and the
Export–Import Bank of China, to reduce the commercial banks’ burden with respect to
financing state‐directed trade and development projects (Xiao, 2009).

In 1984, the first Chinese‐foreign joint‐equity bank, China and South Sea Bank Ltd., was
formed. Two years later the Bank of Communications, the first domestic joint‐equity bank,
was established. By the end of 2007, 12 joint equity banks had been formed five of them
were listed on China’s stock exchanges and others were partially sold to foreign investors
(CBRC, 2007). At the end of 2007, the assets of depositary institutions in China totaled
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31,598.98 billion RMB, of which 14.9% was held by the 12 joint‐equity banks and 56.7% was
held by the four state‐owned banks (CBRC, 2008).

In 1995, the Central Bank Law and the Commercial Bank Law were promulgated. With the
implementation of the Commercial Bank Law, urban and rural credit cooperatives started
to merge and form city‐level commercial banks, which are owned by the state, or in some
cases private capital. Currently, more than 100 city‐level commercial banks were formed in
China (CRBC, 2007).

3.4 The reform of Chinese banking regulatory system
Prior to 1978, People’s Bank of China was the only bank in China, and took both
commercial bank activity and banking regulatory functions. In 1984, the commercial
banking activity was separated from People’s Bank of China with the establishment of
Big‐Stated Banks. In 1995, the law of People’s Republic of China Central was issued. By this
law, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) takes three main responsibilities. They were:
monetary stability, banking supervision and oversight of the payments system. In
1995,together with the assignment to the PBC of its main responsibilities, capital adequacy
requirements were introduced in all commercial banks, as well as prudential ratios, namely
loan to deposit ones and assets to liquid liabilities. These prudential ratios, however, were a
formality (Carcia‐Herrero, 2006). In 2002, the PBC established the international five‐tier
loan classification although it was not made fully compulsory. The reasons for this weak
situation were the PBC’s lack of sanctioning power and decentralized nature of its
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regulatory and supervisory functions (Carcia‐Herrero, 2006). In fact, the bulk of the work
was conducted by the local offices, which themselves had to report to the local
government.

In April 2003, China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was established. It was
centralized and report to central government directly in order to strengthen its supervisory
functions. With the establishment of CBRC there were several improvements in banking
regulatory. Carcia‐Herrero (2006) suggests that these can be divided into asset quality,
capital adequacy and risk management system.

On asset quality, the five‐tier loan classification system was enhanced and made fully
compulsory for all the banks by the end of 2005. In the same vein, full provisioning of the
Not Performed Loan (NPL) will need to be introduced by the end of 2008. In 2005, the
CBRC adopted three new tools to strengthen the monitoring of the banks’ NPLs, namely
making peer group comparison, assessing the deviation of the accuracy of loan
classifications and tracking the migration of loan of different categories. Finally, since the
early 2006, related party lending has been limited, which is quite important given the
concentration of lending in the corporate sector and, in many cases, large stated owned
enterprises.

On capital adequacy, after an evaluation of the compliance with the Basel Core Principles
for Effective Banking of Supervision, the 8percent minimum capital adequacy ratio,
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defined in Basel I terms, was introduced and a 4 percent minimum total capital. These
ratios were fully complied with by 2007.

On risk management system, the CBRC has made accomplishments in strengthening risk
management system in Chinese banking system, through issuing new Guide,
strengthening disciplinary action (Carcia‐Herrero, 2006). The remainder of this chapter
proceeds as follows. Section 3.2.1 reviews the impact of new guide on the risk management
of Chinese banking industry. Section 3.2.2 describes disciplinary action for the enforcement
of new guide.

3.4.1New banking regulatory guidelines
Carcia‐Herrero (2006) points out that the CBRC has played an instrumental role by issuing
regulatory guidelines to help banking institutions accurately understand and faithfully
implement the Chinese governmentʹs policies, and prompting them to improve the
performance of their loan portfolios and risk management．

As early as on June l7．2003．the CBRC issued a Notice of Strengthening Loan Management
and Guarding Against Emerging Risks (CBRC, 2003, no.4),which signaled the potential
risks in bank activities such as excessive expansion of loans and irrational loan
portfolios．and set out the tasks for the scrutiny of bank lending activities, in particular the
quality of new loans．
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On February. 15, 2004, the CBRC issued Guidelines on Due Diligence in the Credit
Extension Work of Commercial Banks (CBRC, 2004, no.19), by which a commercial bank is
required to make their loan guaranteed, and closely check the ability of the guarantor, the
ownership and value of the guarantee or pledge, and the feasibility for realizing the right
to mortgage or pledge. Only the borrower who is confirmed as having excellent credibility
and can truly repay the loans need not provide a guarantee. This guideline also requires
commercial bank to extend short‐term loans to companies with higher credit risk.

On April 30．2004, the CBRC issued another Notice of Implementing the National Macro
Control Policies and Further Strengthening Management of Lending Risk (CBRC, 2004,
No.22),in which seven specific instructions were promptly announced for enhanced loan
risk management.

On October. 25．2005, the CBRC issued Provisional Risk Assessment System for Joint‐Stock
Commercial Banks (CBRC, 2005, no.18). The Assessment System is developed to facilitate
an overall assessment of each Joint‐Stock Commercial Banks performance in risk
management, asset quality, management administration, earnings, and sensitivity to
market risk and, by weighting the component assessment, assign a composite rating to
each Joint‐Stock Commercial Banks. The assessment conclusions will provide a foundation
for supervision of each Joint‐Stock Commercial Banks by risk and will serve as an
important reference for the bank’s market entry and fit and proper test for its directors and
senior managers. In particular, the regulatory authority will determine the on‐site
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examination frequency and scope as well as its supervisory actions on the basis of the
assessment conclusions.

On August 26, 2005, the CBRC issued Guidelines on Banks’ Credit Businesses to Small
Enterprises (CBRC, 2005, no.23). The Guideline signaled that a bank should attach
importance to on‐site inspection, when making credit investigation, pay more attention to
collateral, financial statements rather than simply rely on various written documents
presented by small enterprises. A bank should pay attention to collecting non‐financial
information of small enterprises, including the personal credit records, household income
and expenditure of the owners or major shareholders, the operation and management
status, technical conditions, industrial situation and market prospects of the enterprises.

Lai (2007) states that although CBRA promulgated these supervisory rules and regulatory
documents on risk management in the banking industry, most of them are aimed at
minimizing credit risk, not at preventing market risk and operation risk. A risk‐based
supervisory legal framework needs to cover all three major areas

3.4.2 The inspection and disciplinary action of CBRC on Chinese commercial bank.
The CBRC is authorized by law to regulate and supervise all the banking institutions in
China and their business activities. As Table 3.1 shows, about 3,000 CBRC examiners
conducted stringent on‐site inspection of bank loans to Chinese commercial banks. In this
way, the CBRC effectively directed banking institutions to operate in compliance with
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Chinese banking regulatory law and guidelines (Lai, 2007).

Table 3.1 Disciplinary actions of CBRC
2003

2004

2005

2006

Number of Banking Institutions Examined

61702

74911

68360

69179

Amount of Penalties on Illegal Transactions(RMB 100 Million)

1768

5840

7671

10147

Number of Banking Entities which Received Penalties on rule‐breaking activities

1512

2202

1205

1104

Number of Senior Managerial Personnel with Qualifications Revoked

257

244

325

243

Average Institutional Coverage Ratio of on‐site Examinations

27.8

36

34

35

Note: Source is from China Banking Regulatory Commission annual report

3.5 Conclusion
This chapter has outlined the features of the Chinese banking system and the change to
banking regulatory system.

China is a developing country with a changing banking system. With the process of
transferring from planned economy to market economy, Chinese government started to
reduce the control on the banks and tried to make it be independent Commercial
Corporation rather than a department of government. The new banking regulatory system
needs to be established for the commercial bank in market economy. In 2003, China’s
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was established and authorized by law to
regulate and supervise all the banking institutions in China and their business activities.
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On Feb. 15, 2004, the CBRC issued Guidelines on Due Diligence in the Credit Extension
Work of Commercial Banks (CBRC, 2004, no.19). The guideline states that the commercial
shall extend short term loan and collaterized loan to the borrowers, only the borrowers
with certain future can get long term loan and needn’t provide collateral for their loan.
Therefore, relationship between the borrower’s credit risk and loan characteristics are
changed with the establishment of CBRC and the enforcement of the guide.

This chapter shows that the change of banking regulatory system could have an impact on
the relationship between borrowers’ credit risk and their loan characteristics. The next
chapter will develop hypotheses regarding this relationship under the theory that
presented in Chapter 2 and the Chinese special situation presented in this chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR‐ Hypotheses

4.1 Introduction
The previous chapters outlined the research objectives and the theoretical framework of
credit risk and the characteristics of the Chinese Banking Regulatory system. To achieve
the research objective presented in Chapter 1, this chapter will build on the theoretical
framework discussed in Chapter 2 and the context of the Chinese banking regulatory
system presented in Chapter 3 to set three questions and their accompanying hypotheses.

In Section 4.2, presents the hypothesis for Question 1: Does a collateralized loan imply a
higher risk of default? Section 4.3 presents the hypothesis for Question 2: Is the credit risk
markedly higher for borrowers with short‐term loans than for borrowers with long‐term
loans? Section 4.4 presents the hypothesis for Question 3: is the credit risk increasingly
related to loan term and collateral after the implementation of Chinaʹs new banking
regulatory system? Section 4.5 summarises the chapter and suggests some implications for
the discussion of methodology and sample data in Chapter 5.

4.2 Question 1: Does the collateralized loan imply higher default risk?
The banks tend to associate the requirement of collateral with greater credit risk. As
presented in Chapter 2, there is also theoretical argument (Manove and Padilla, 1999)
supporting the possibility that more collateral implies more non‐performing loans (ex post
credit risk) or greater PD. Some empirical evidences support the above theoretical
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argument. For example, Orgler (1970) presents the evidence that the requirement of
collateral is associated with greater credit risk. More collateral implies more
non‐performing loans or greater probability of default. Jimenez (2004) also shows that
collateral is associated with high default probability by Spanish evidence. Under the above
theory framework and empirical evidence, we investigate that borrower credit risk is
related to the level of collateral. This leads to the first hypothesis as follow:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Borrowers with a higher proportion of collateralized loan in their total
loan have a higher credit risk.

4.3 Question2: Is the credit risk markedly higher for borrowers with short‐term loans
than for borrowers with long‐term loan?
Banks are also inclined to extend short‐term loans to firms with a more uncertain future,
while safer enterprises tend to have better access to loans with longer, fixed maturities.
From Swedish and American evidence, Carling (2007) and Barclay et al (1995) find that the
risk of default is markedly higher for short‐term loans than for long‐term credit. Borrowers
with a mix of short‐term and long‐term credit are significantly safer than short‐term ones,
but riskier than long‐term borrowers.

Diamond’s (1991) findings indicate that debt maturity has a relationship with the credit
risk of borrowers. Diamond (1991) argues that high risk firms use short‐term debt (high
risk firms may be refused long‐term debt because of a high default probability) and less
risk firms use long‐term debt (these firms avoid short‐term debt to minimize refinancing
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risk). Stohs and Mauer (1996) find empirical evidence consistent with this finding of
Diamonds (1991).

On the basis of above mentioned, we can make the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The borrower’s proportion of long term loan is significantly and
negatively related to the credit risk of the borrower.

4.4 Question 3: Is the credit risk increasingly related to loan term and collateral after the
implementation of China’s new banking regulatory system?

In 2003, China’s banking regulatory system embarked on reforms of Chinese banking
system. The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was established and
authorized by law to regulate and supervise all the banking institutions in China and their
business activities. CBRC plays an active role in China‘s banking reform. In 2004, the
revised Commercial Bank Law of the People’s Republic of China and the Guideline (CBRC,
2004, No19) were issued. The law states that, “In granting loans, a commercial bank shall
require the borrower to provide guarantee, and closely check the ability of the guarantor,
the ownership and value of the guarantee, pledge, and the feasibility for realizing the right
to mortgage or pledge. Where, after checking and evaluation by a commercial bank, a
borrower is confirmed as having excellent credibility and can truly repay the loans, it need
not provide a guarantee.” The guideline (CBRC, 2004, no.19) stipulated that a commercial
bank shall, according to the customer’s repayment capacity and cash flow, make
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adjustments on the credit extended to the customer, including renewal, increase or
decrease of the credit amount and term. The commercial bank shall also require the
borrower to make repayment in advance. In 2004, the China Banking Regulatory
Commission began to carry out supervision and inspection of the new banking regulatory
law enforcement. As a result of the implementation of this law and guideline there are
more borrowers with a high credit risk that can only get access to short term loans by
providing collateral; therefore, affecting the relationship between the credit risk of
borrowers and their loan characteristics. The following hypothesis can be made based on
the literature given above.

Hypothesis 3 (H3): A borrowerʹs loan characteristics and credit risk are more closely
related after the implementation of Chinaʹs new banking regulatory law and guideline in
2004.

4.5 Summary of the chapter
To achieve the research objective presented in Chapter 1, in this chapter three research
questions were specified and corresponding hypotheses were developed in the context of
the theory framework and Chinaʹs special circumstances.

According to the theoretical arguments (Manove and Padilla, 1999), we stated Hypothesis 1:
more collateral implies higher credit risk. Based on Diamonʹs (1991) theory, we stated
Hypothesis 2: the borrower with more long‐term loan has lower credit risk. Building on the
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overview of Chinese banking regulatory system, we specified Hypothesis 3, the
relationship between loan characteristics and credit risk is strengthened with the
enforcement of Chinaʹs new banking regulatory guideline. The next chapter will test these
hypothesizes by quantitative methods.
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CHAPTER FIVE‐Methodology and Sample Data

5.1 Introduction
The previous chapters outlined the research questions and specified the hypothesis for
each research question. Building on the previous work, this chapter will test the research
hypotheses and questions regarding the determinants of credit risk and the impact of new
banking regulatory system on the relationship between credit risk and loan characteristics.

Most of the empirical evidence on credit risk to date is based on data from the developed
countries rather than developing countries. For example, Carling (1988) examined the
determinants of credit risk using data from Sweden and Jimenez (2004) used data from
Spain. However, there are a small number of studies that provide evidence from
developing countries. Lukas (2005) analyzed data from Thailand, and Wei (2007) used
non‐listed firms data from China.

Although these studies investigated the determinants of credit risk, the majority are
restricted to developed rather than developing countries. This research will add empirical
evidence from developing countries. Another important question not answered by
previous research is how a change in the banking regulatory system affects the relationship
between a firm’s credit risk and its loan characteristics, the strengthened banking
regulatory system in China provides an interesting research environment in relation to this
question. Therefore, unlike earlier studies, this research focuses also on the effect of the
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change of banking regulatory system on interaction between a firm’s credit risk and its loan
characteristics. As noted in Chapter 2, the theories argue (for example, Fridson, 1997) that
the macro economy has impact on firmsʹ credit risk. Previous studies have not taken into
account the effect of economic factors on the credit risk in China. This research will cover
this gap. Furthermore, the previous studies on China (Xu, 2006; Tang, 2005; Wei, 2007)
have been based on small and, in some respects, biased samples comprised of non‐listed
firms. This study will cover this gap by using a large‐scale, listed‐firm data set compiled by
the author.

Section 5.2 presents the methodology, including model and variable definition. Section 5.3
discusses the sample selection criteria. Section 5.4 describes the statistics on the sample.
Section 5.5 concludes the chapter and suggests some implications for the studyʹs empirical
results (Chapter 6).

5.2 Methodology
In response to the investigation and examination of the above hypotheses quantitative
methods will be adopted.

In order to test how the credit risk of borrowers is related to the loan characteristics, a
modified version of the logit models used in Estrella et al (1998) is applied here. We
regress dependent variable of credit risk to a firm’s financial ratio variable,
macro‐economic factors and loan characteristic variables. The model is as follows:
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P r [ p = 1 ] = a 0 + a 1T S it − 2 + a 2 T L / T A it − 2 + a 3 T L / T A * D u m 1 +
a 4 E B IT A / T A it − 2 + a 5 I T S it − 2 + a 6 L T Pi t − 2 * D u m 2 + a 7 L T Pi t − 2 +
a 8 C L Pi t − 2 * D u m 2 + a 9 C L Pi t − 2 + a 1 0 Y C it − 1 + a 1 1 C E it − 1 + a 1 2 O G it − 2

The subscripts i and t represent companies and years, respectively.
When the default happens, p takes 1.When the default doesnot happen, p takes zero. Pr
[p=1] refers to the probability of the borrower default, ; it is defined as a dependent variable
(Jimenez, 2003; Sjur, 2000; Eikki, 1999). Altman (1968, 1971, 1973, 1984) defined the
borrowers who went into bankruptcy as default borrowers. However, by the end of 2007,
no more than 15 listed firms in China had gone into bankruptcy. In China, the main default
has been concentrated in the firms identified as Special Treatment (ST) companies (Wei,
2007). To avoid biasing the results of the research, the listed firms that went into
bankruptcy aren’t defined as being in default in this research. In this research, borrower
default refers to the companies which are identified as ST companies by the China Security
Regulatory Commission (Wei, 2007).

In the Shanghai and Shenzheng stock market, if the China Security Regulatory Commission
considered the listed firm as one with a poor performance over the past two years, which
could lead to a possible loss for shareholders and creditors, the China Security Regulatory
Commission identifies it as an ST Firm. However, Chinese listed companies seldom go into
bankruptcy. The qualification of being listed on the stock market is very valuable; therefore,
when a listed firm is identified as an ST Firm, some other non‐listed firm will annex and
reorganize it. By this way, it can qualify to be listed on the stock market. In more than 90%
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of ST listed companies that are annexed and reorganised, the bank, as lender, makes
concessions, leading to the loss of interest on the loan and sometimes even the loss of the
principal (Wei,2007). Consequently, in the Chinese context, if a firm is identified as an ST
firm， it is considered a default firm. Because the insolvent listed firm is identified as ST
before it goes into bankruptcy, the insolvent firms have been grouped in this research with
the default firms.

In addition to the above definition of default, to make robustness test, we use other criteria
to define default: leverage. With LEV (leverage), we consider a firm to be default firm if
LEV (leverage) of the firm is greater than one. It means that a firm’s total outstanding debt
is more than its total asset.

In the right side of equation, financial‐ratio variables, macroeconomic variables and
loan‐characteristics variables are incorporated. The financial‐ratio variables include TL/TA
(total liability/total asset), IT (inventory/total sale), TS (total sale), and EBITA (earning
before tax and interest). Macroeconomic variables include YC (yield curve), OG (output
gap), and CE (customer expectation).Loan‐characteristics variables include the proportion
of long‐term loan and the proportion of collateralized loan in the total loan. To capture the
impact of the establishment of the CBRC and the Guideline issued in 2004, we incorporate
the dummy variable Dum into the model. Dum equals 1 if the observation is during
2004‐2005, 0 otherwise. According to the definition of firms with government monopoly
(Wang,2008), more than 70 firms are define as the firm with government monopoly.
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TS, EBITDA/TA, TL/TA and I/TS are the financial ratios of borrowers and are widely used
to explain borrowersʹ credit risk in the credit‐risk model. There is much empirical evidence
that these financial ratios explain credit risk very well (Altman, 1968, 1971, 1973, 1984;
Frydman et al., 1985; Li, 1999; Shumway, 2001). To be consistent with prior research (Fu,
2005), we lagged companies’ financial ratio variables by two years in regressions.

In this model, three macroeconomic variables have been incorporated as control variables.
OG refers to the output gap (Carling, 2007). It is an important indicator of future inflation
rate. Carling (2007) provides evidence that there is a strong relationship between output
gap and the borrowersʹ credit risk. In this research, the output gap is computed according
to the method developed by Qingwan (2004). YC refers to yield curve (Estrella and
Hardouvelis, 1991). Estrella and Mishkin (1998) provide evidence that yield curve can be an
indicator of credit risk. In this research, YC is the spread between five‐year fixed‐term
interest and three‐month fixed‐term interest. CE refers to the customer expectation index.
Carling (2007) points out that Customer Confidence can affect the borrowersʹ credit risk. In
this research, this variable is measured by China’s Customer Expectation Index, which is
produced by China’s National Statistics Bureau. It is a commonly held belief supported by
evidence (Carling, 2007), that defaults increase after a macroeconomic recession. To be
consistent with prior research, we lagged macro economic variables by one year in the
regression
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Carling (2007) provides evidence that borrowerʹs loan‐term structure has an impact on
credit risk. In this research, the proportion of long‐term loan in the borrower’s total loan is
used to represent the structure of the borrowerʹs loan term. ʺLong‐term loanʺ refers to loans
with duration of more than one year. Jimenez (2004) suggests that collateral increases the
probability of loan default. Collateral as a variable is incorporated into the model, and the
relationship between credit risk and collateral is estimated. The collateralized proportion of
the loan in the firm’s total loan is calculated to represents variable collateral. In this
research, we explores whether loan characteristics can forecast defaults by lagging the
loan‐characteristics variables in the regressions. The financial‐ratio variables are lagged by
two years. To be consistent with the financial ratio, the loan‐characteristics variables are
lagged by two years in regression.
Table 5.1 Variable definitions
Variables

Definition

Financial ratio
TS

Total sale

I/TS

Inventory/total sale

TL/TA

Total liability /Total asset

EBITDA/TA

Earning before tax and interest/Total asset

Macro economic
OG

Output Gap, computed according to the method developed by Guo Qingwang(2004)

YC

Yield curve, the spread between 5‐ year and 3 ‐month fixed term interest rate.

CE

China’s Customer Expectation Index

Loan characteristics
PCL

Firm’s proportion of collateralized loan in the total loan

PLL

Firm’s proportion of long term loan in the total loan

Dum1

Equal to 1 if the firm has a government monopoly, 0 otherwise.

Dum2

Equals to 1 if the observation is during period of 2004‐2005,0 otherwise

Note: We exclude financial institutions in our sample.

5.3 Sample Data
52

In this study, all the financial and accounting data are obtained from the listed companies’
annual reports which can be accessed through the China Security Regulatory Commission
and Data Service Company, GTA (Wei, 2007). Macro economic data is obtained from
China’s National Statistics Bureau and the People’s Bank of China.

All listed companies in the GTA database have been used. In 2004, the new banking
regulatory law was issued, and the China Banking Regulatory Commission began to carry
out the supervision and inspection of its enforcement. To identify the effect of the new law
on the relationship between the borrowersʹ credit risk and the borrower’s loan
characteristics, the panel data from 2002 to 2007 was selected. From 2002, Chinese listed
companies started to adopt international auditing and accounting standards, and are now
required to disclose information according to these standards. Consequently, the data from
2002‐2007 is more stable and credible, and is more suitable for the research.

The population for this study is all the Chinese companies listed on the Shanghai Stock
Exchange. Consistent with most of the research on China’s listed companies’ credit risk
(Wang, 1998; Fu, 2005; Wei, 2007), the selection criteria of the sample in the population is as
follows: first, financial companies and entities, considered to have special characteristics
have been excluded, consistent with previous literature; second, all the observations that
do not have a complete record for all variables, as well as the companies that have missing
data in the fields required for the tests in this study, have been excluded. After taking the
selection criteria into consideration, the sampling process has generated a final sample that
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consists of 661 companies, and 2,649 firm‐year observations covering 2002 to 2007.
5.4 Sample Statistics
Table 5.2 presents sample statistics for firm default, firm financial ratio, loan characteristics
and firm characteristics for the total sample. The results indicate a steady increase in total
sales across the sample years, with a mean of RMB 1,898 million in 2002, RMB 2,137 million
in 2003, RMB 2,235 million in 2004, and RMB 2,458 million in 2005. The increase of total
sales for the sample firms reflects the quick development of the Chinese macro economy.
We can also determine some trends in firmsʹ financial ratio of firm. The mean of I/TS is 0.36
in 2002, 0.43 in 2003, 0.45 in 2004 and, 0.51in 2005. The mean of Tl/Ta is 0.47 in 2002, 0.53 in
2003, .0.59 in 2004, and 0.62 in 2005, showing that the listed firms have higher and higher
leverage rates from 2002 to 2005. The mean of EBITDA/ TA falls from 0.007 in 2002 to 0.005
in 2005. By examining the financial ratios of listed firm, we can see that over the period
examined, listed firms increase in size, while the profitability and operational efficiency go
down and leverage rates goes up. This finding is supported by prior studies (Zhang, 2008),
which states that the profit increase in Chinese firms is attributable more to new
investment than to gains in efficiency.

Table 5.2 presents sample statistics for firm default, firm financial ratio, loan characteristics
and firm characteristics for the total sample. The results indicate a steady increase in total
sale across the sample years, with mean of RMB1898 million in 2002, RMB2137 million in
2003, RMB2235 million in 2004, to RMB2458 million in 2005.The increase of sample firm
total sale reflects the quick development of Chinese macro‐economic. We can also find out
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some trends of financial ratio of firm. The mean of I/TS is 0.36 in 2002, 0.43 in 2003, 0.45 in
2004, 0.51in 2005, it continues to increase. The mean of Tl/Ta is 0.47 in 2002, 0.53 in
2003, .0.59 in 2004, and 0.62 in 2005, it shows that the listed firms have higher and higher
leverage rate from 2002 to 2005. The mean of EBITDA/ TA also shows the downtrend. It
falls from 0.007 in 2002 to 0.005 in 2005. By the financial ratio of listed firm, we can find out
the trend that the size of listed firm is bigger and bigger, while the profitability and
operation efficiency go down, the leverage rate goes up. This finding is supported by prior
studies (Zhang, 2008) which states the profit increase of Chinese firms is more achieved by
the new investment rather than the efficiency promotion.

Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics
Variables

Year

Mean

Max

Min

Std.Dev.

2002

1897.55

39477.6

12.65

12895.8

2003

2136.75

43679.7

18.73

12023.8

2004

2235.46

49258.6

23.18

13875.9

2005

2458.21

51234.2

25.17

14213.1

2002

0.36

0.96

0.02

0.6

2003
2004

0.43
0.45

0.97
0.99

0.01
0.03

0.61

2005

0.51

0.98

0.01

0.59
0.58

2002

0.47

1.15

0.02

0.36

2003

0.53

1.18

0.02

0.35

2004

0.59

1.17

0.04

0.33

2005

0.62

1.19

0.02

0.41

2002

0.007

0.21

‐0.14

0.34

2003

0.006

0.19

‐0.17

0.33

2004

0.006

0.2

‐0.19

0.30

2005

0.005

0.25

‐0.16

0.34

Financial ratio
TS (Total Sale, Million RMB )

I/TS(Inventory/Total Sale)

TL/TA(Total Liability/Total Asset)

EBITDA/TA

Macro‐economic variable
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Output gap

2003

0.85%

2004

1.83%

2005

2.23%

2006

2.71%

2002

0.72%

2003

0.90%

2004

0.90%

2005

1.26%

2002

98

2003

95

2004

92.5

2005

94.5

2004

51

2005

46

2006

65

2007

83

2004

78

2005

92

2006

86

2007

83

2004

71

2005

70

2006

72

2007

71

Yield curve

Customer Expectation

The number of default firm
ST

LEV

The number of firm with government
monopoly

Note: The variables are defined in table 5.1
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Table 5.3

Summary statistics of loan characteristics

Loan Characteristics

Full sample

2002‐2003
STD

2004‐2005
Mean

STD

Difference

Mean

STD

Mean

Mean

proportion of collateralized loan

0.69

0.64

0.65

0.61

0.73

0.68

0.08

proportion of long‐term loan

0.34

0.28

0.34

0.28

0.33

0.27

‐0.01

proportion of collateralized loan

0.79

0.47

0.76

0.71

0.82

0.20

0.06**

proportion of long‐term loan

0.27

0.18

0.31

0.19

0.22

0.17

‐0.09**

proportion of collateralized loan

0.81

0.65

0.78

0.63

0.85

0.71

0.07**

proportion of long‐term loan

0.30

0.26

0.36

0.32

0.26

0.20

‐0.1**

Active firm

Default firm (ST)

Default firm (Lev)

Note: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively

Table 5.3 presents summary statistics of loan characteristics for sample firms. Mean and
standard deviation (STD) of loan characteristics are reported for loans in the full sample,
loans in period of 2002‐2003 and loans in period of 2004‐2005. The means of the differences
between the variables in period of 2002‐2003 and period of 2004‐2005 are also reported. In
table 5.3, several interesting findings emerge. First and foremost, long term loan
proposition is higher for default firms during 2002‐2003 than those during 2004‐2005.
Collateralized Loan proportion is lower for default firms during 2002‐2003 than those
during 2004‐2005. The differences are statistically significant at the 5% and 1% percent level.
We can also find out that the difference of loan characteristics variables of active firms in
periods 2002‐2003 and 2004‐2005 aren’t statistically significant.

5.5 Conclusion
This chapter presents the adopted methodology to test the hypotheses specified in Chapter
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4.

This research follows Estrella (1998) in applying logit models to credit risk. The firm credit
risk is regressed on macro‐economic variables, accounting variables and loan
characteristics variables. The dummy variable is introduced into the model to capture the
impact of the new banking regulatory system.

This chapter presented the sample selection criteria and derives the statistics from the
sample. The trend found was that during the period of 2002‐2007, listed firms increased in
size while their profitability and operational efficiency went down and their leverage rates
rose. This chapter also made the T test for loan‐characteristics variables, and found that the
proportion of long‐term loan is higher and collateralized loan proportion is lower for
default firms since the establishment of the CBRC and the enforcement of the new
guidelines.

This chapter presented the methodology and sample selection criteria for testing the
hypothesis. The next chapter will discuss the empirical results from this methodology and
show whether the hypotheses are supported by the empirical evidence.
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CHAPTER SIX‐ Empirical Results
6.1 Introduction
The previous chapters specified the hypotheses corresponding to each research question,
and designed the methodology for testing the hypotheses. This chapter will discuss the
empirical results achieved using that methodology. The empirical results will show
whether the hypotheses are supported by the empirical evidence.

As noted in Chapter 2, most of the empirical works have been conducted in, and typically
focus in developed countries. For example, Carling (2007) finds that higher collateralized
loan proportion implies a higher default rate, and borrowers with more long‐term loan
have a lower probability of default. In evidence from Spain, Jimenez (2004) shows that
credit risk is positively related to collateral requirement. Although there are some studies
of the determinants of credit risk in developing countries, they are still very limited. For
example, using evidence from Thailand, Lukas (2005) finds that collateral requirement is
positively related to credit risk. Using non‐listed firms data from China, Wei (2007) shows
that long‐term loans have lower credit risk and collateralised loans lead to higher credit
risk than non‐ collateralised loans. Several researchersʹ theories (Diamond, 1991; Manove
and Padilla, 1999) are supported by these empirical results. However, these results are still
very limited, and do not consider the evidence offered by listed firms.
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The objective of this chapter is to discuss the empirical results from a large‐scale, Chinese
listed‐firm data set compiled by the author, and to show whether the theories discussed
above are still supported by this evidence. We will also discuss the effect of Chinaʹs new
banking regulatory system on the interaction between loans characteristics and credit risk.

Section

6.2

discusses

accounting‐information

the

empirical

variables,

and

result

on

macroeconomic

loan‐characteristics

variables.

variables,
Section

6.3

summarizes the chapter and suggests some implications for the conclusions from this
study (Chapter 7).

6.2 Empirical result discussion
To control the multicollinearty, we made Correlation test between all independent variables.
The correlations between each pair of independent variables are presented in Table 6.1 .It is
obvious that multicollinearty is not a problem in the model (as most correlations are less
than 0.30).
Table 6.1 Correlation matrix between all variables

TS
I/TS
TL/TA
EBITDA/TA
PCL

TS

I/TS

TL/TA

EBITDA/TA

CLP

LLP

YC

OG

CE

1

‐0.21*

0.12*

‐0.19*

0.27*

0.28*

‐0.17*

0.22

0.13*

1

0.02*

0.06

‐0.01*

0.01*

0.06**

0.19

‐0.24*

1

0.23*

0.01*

0.19*

0.09*

0.07*

‐0.12*

1

‐0.07*

‐0.09

0.27*

0.17*

‐0.02

1

‐0.12*

0.11

0.01*

0.05*

1

0.03*

0.14*

0.19

1

0.04*

0.04*

1

0.05*

PLL
YC
OG

CE

1

Note: Significance at the 10%, 5%, level is indicated by *, ** respectively
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Table 6.2 provides the regression results on credit risk and financial ratio, loan
characteristics, and macro‐economic factors. It presents the estimated coefficients and Z
statistics for the model specifications. After controlling for other factors, the results show
that both the proportion of long term loans and the proportion of collateralized loans are
related with credit risk. Both of their coefficients are significant at 5% and 1%.

The coefficient of variable PCL is positive and significant. This shows that the proportion of
collateralized loan in the total loan has a positive relationship with credit risk, which
supports hypothesis 1. This result is consistent with prior empirical evidence (e.g. Jimenez,
2004) and follows the theoretical prediction (Manove et al, 1999) which argues that more
collateral implies more non‐performing loans (ex‐ post credit risk) or greater probability of
default because banks have less incentive to undertake adequate screening of potential
borrowers and loans at the time of the decision if banks are protected by a high level of
collateral. It is also consistent with common thinking in China’s Banking Industry that
borrowers with uncertain future need to provide more collateral for their loan because the
banks need to hedge against a higher probability of default to control LGD (loss at given
default).

The coefficient of variable PLL is negative and significant. This result shows that the credit
risk of borrowers with more long‐term loans is markedly lower than that of those with
shorter‐term loans, which confirms Hypothesis 2. This find is consistent with the
theoretical prediction (Diamond, 1991) that risky firms use short‐term debt and less‐risky
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firms use long‐term debt. This finding is also consistent with prior empirical evidence (e.g.
Stohs, 1996), and with the common perception in the banking industry that that banks are
more inclined to extend short‐term loans to companies with a more uncertain future, while
safer enterprises tend to get loans with longer terms.
The regression result also shows that variables PLL*Dum and PCL*Dum coefficient are
significant at 5% level. PLL*Dum coefficient is –0.52 which means that a firm’s proportion
of long‐term loan has a stronger negative relationship with a firm’s credit risk after the end
of 2003. PCL*Dum coefficient is 0.62 which suggests that the proportion of collateralized
loan has a more significantly positively relationship with a firm’s credit risk after the end
of 2003; this supports Hypothesis 3. This result implies that the relationship between credit
risk and loan characteristic is strengthened with the enforcement of the new banking
system regulatory guideline. More borrowers with a high credit risk can only get access to
short‐term loans by providing collateral after the implementation of the guideline.

The result also shows that the ratio of total liabilities / total assets in firms without
government monopoly has a positive relationship with credit risk at 5% significance level.
This result is consistent with the theory (Altman, 1968), which states that higher leverage
result in higher credit risk. We also find the coefficient of TL/TA*Dum1 is negative at 5%
significance level. This means that in firms with government monopoly the higher the
leverage, the lower (stronger) the credit risk of the borrower. The prior studies on China’s
listed firms provided evidence that credit risk is positively related with the ratio of total
liabilities / total assets (Xu, 2006), but with relatively new panel data, we document a
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significant negative relationship between credit risk and total liabilities / total assets in
firms with government monopoly. This result is consistent with Wangʹs research (Wang,
2008), which states that bank managers place greater importance on loan safety because
default can lead to the investigation of bank managers themselves. As a result, more banks
compete for the firms with government monopoly which is considered never default.
These firms take advantage of this competition to obtain more loans from banks, and
banks also tend to more readily grant loans to them, resulting in much higher levels of
debt funding within their capital structure. Although counter‐intuitive, these results which
support Wang’s research show that firms with government monopoly (low credit risk) are
associated with high total liabilities / total assets

The regression result also shows that credit risk is related to macro‐economic variables.
Output gap has a negative relationship with credit risk. Carling (2007) points out that the
output gap functions as an indicator of demand conditions. Higher aggregate demand
relative to production capacity can be expected to reduce default risk. The result of our
research supports this prediction.

In this research, the yield curve coefficient is not highly significant .Research by Estrella
and Hardouvelis (1991) and Estrella and Mishkin (1998) suggests that the yield curve can
be an important indicator of future real activity;i.e., a positively sloping yield curve signals
higher future economic activity and, conversely, a negatively sloped yield curve indicates
an expectation of a fall in economic activity. Therefore, we expect that an increase in the
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spread between the short‐ and long‐term interest rate is associated with decreasing default
rates, since banks and firms will act upon this information. However, our results do not
support this prediction well. The cause of insignificance of the yield curve coefficient could
be inappropriate data. In this research, the measurement of yield curve is spread between
the five‐year interest rate and three‐month interest rates. The data resource is People’s
Bank of China. The official interest rate is used to calculate yield curve. Some prior research
(Tang, 2005) points out that there is big difference between Chinese official interest and real
interest in Chinese lending market, the former is controlled by the Chinese government
and can’t reflect the real demand

and price of capital.

The regression shows that the customer expectation index is negatively related to credit
risk. It is consistent with the theory (Carling, 2007) that positive customer expectations
about increased future economic activity reduce the default rate today

Our main findings are very robust under the robustness test. We conducted the test by
implementing various criteria for defining default (using leverage and special treatment as
the measures). Our main results remain unchanged.
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Table 6.2 Regression Results (data ranges from 2002‐2007, including 2649
observations )
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Dependant variable:

Dependant variable:

Dependant variable:

Dependant variable:

Credit Risk(Lev)

Credit Risk(ST)
coefficient

z-Statistic

coefficient

z-Statistic

Credit Risk(ST)
coefficient

z-Statistic

Credit Risk(Lev)
coefficien

z-Statistic

t
financial ratio
TL/TA

1.75

3.28

1.77

2.31

TL/TA*Dum1

-3.15

-2.45

-2.91

-2.41

ITS

1.18

2.19

0.91

TS

-2.82

-4.23

EBITA

-2.24

OUTPUT GAP

1.75

3.28

1.77

2.31

3.17

2.12

2.33

0.74

1.97

-3.19

-3.01

-3.88

-6.84

-4.12

-5.21

-3.21

-2.09

-2.35

-1.54

-5.18

-2.17

-3.19

-1.85

-4.22

-4.09

-4.49

-3.85

-2.13

-4.77

-3.42

YIELD

9.81

1.49

5.21

2.13

12.49

1.53

7.11

1.71

CUSTOMER

-0.03

-4.11

-0.04

-3.21

-0.02

-5.87

-0.02

-6.43

PLL

-0.65

-2.42

-0.61

-3.77

-0.68

-2.17

-0.59

-3.42

PCL

1.08

4.29

0.85

3.21

1.08

4.29

0.85

3.21

PLL*Dum2

-0.52

-2.91

-0.32

-2.79

-0.57

-2.24

-0.39

-2.77

PCL*Dum2

0.62

2.12

0.62

2.95

0.59

2.88

0.61

3.11

macro‐econom
ic factor

INDEX
Loan
characteristics

Note: Z‐statistics are produced to evaluate the significance of coefficient.

6.3 Summary of the chapter
This chapter analyses the empirical result on listed‐firm credit risk on the Shanghai Stock
Exchange from 2002 to 2007. The issue of credit risk in developing countries attracts
considerable interest, since most of the theoretical and empirical work on credit risk
considers only developed countries. In this study, we examined whether the theories
originating from developed countries are still supported by the empirical result of Chinese
listed firms.
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Based on the time period 2002‐2007, the results indicate that the credit risk of Chinese listed
firms is positively related to their loan‐term structure. The firms with more collateralized
loans have higher credit risk. The empirical results show that previous theories
(Diamond,1991; Manove and Padilla, 1999) are still are pertinent.

Furthermore, the results suggested that the changes in the of new banking regulatory
system have an impact on the relationship between credit risk and loan characteristics.The
empirical results indicate that this relationship is strengthened with the establishment of
the new banking regulatory system. All hypothesizes formulated in Chapter 4 are
supported by our empirical result.

In conclusion, the results suggest that the theories of both Diamond (1991) and Manove et
al. (1999), and other theories in the literature related to credit risk are pertinent. Chapter 7
will present implications of the empirical result, and the contribution and limitations of
this research, and make recommendations for further research directions.
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CHAPTER SEVEN ‐ Conclusion
7.1 Introduction
This thesis has aimed to examine the impact of listed firm’s loan characteristics on their
credit risk in an emerging market, using China as a case study. The topic of credit risk is
one of the most durable issues in modern corporate finance, and has seen the emergence of
a number of rival theoretical and empirical explanations about what factors influence
credit risk. However, while different theories and models have investigated the
determinants of credit risk, to my best knowledge, no comprehensive study on the
relationship between loan characteristics and credit risk in an emerging market has been
done.

Attempts to test and examine the various theories in the field (loan characteristics) have
resulted in a vast empirical literature. The empirical research on the relationship between
loan characteristics and credit risk has been conducted in the developed markets such as
the USA and the UK. However, there is an increasing awareness that theories originating
from developed countries may have limited applicability to, and need to be tested, in
emerging markets. The characteristics of firms and markets that could affect firms’ credit
risk are more likely to be different in developing countries than in developed countries
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(Lin, 2009). The analysis of the relationship between loan characteristics and credit risk in
an emerging stock market has, until recently, been very limited. China has a unique
intuitional setting especially its special banking regulatory environment. Furthermore,
other emerging markets may have similar characteristics to China: for example, the
behavior of defaulted firms in China may share some important similarities with those in
other emerging markets. This provided a central motivation for this study, using China as
a case study.

This chapter will summarize the main findings of the study, discusses some of the possible
implications for firmsʹ credit risk, and identifies areas for further research. Section 7.2
presents a brief overview of each chapter in the thesis. Section 7.3 provides a discussion of
the results and some of their possible implications. Section 7.4 discusses the limitations of
the study. The last section (Section 7.5) offers some recommendations for further research.

7.2 A summary of the thesis
Chapter 2 provided an overview and analysis of the evolution of the theoretical
consideration of credit risk. It concluded that, to date, the determinants of credit risk
remain unsolved and unclear. Despite extensive research on credit risk, there is still no
consensus about which theory can best explain the relationship between a firm’s credit risk
and its loan characteristics. The chapter also noted the lack of empirical study of an
emerging market, which has motivated the use of China as a case study in this research.
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Chapter 3 outlined Chinese banking reform and the change in the banking regulatory
system, which affects the relationship between the credit risk of borrowers and their loan
characteristics. Previous studies didn’t take into account the effect of regulatory factors on
the relationship between borrowersʹ credit risk and their loan characteristics. This chapter
provided the motivation to study the influence of new banking regulatory law on the
relationship between a firm’s credit risk and its loan characteristics.

The following chapters 4, 5 and 6 cover the empirical study. These three chapters examined
the determinants of credit risk using a sample of Chinese listed firms. Three testable
hypotheses were developed. The empirical results suggested that collateral, as proxied by
the collateralized loan proportion, seems to be positively related to the credit risk. This is
consistent with the theory prediction (Manove and Padilla, 1999). A firm’s long‐term loan
proportion is found to have a negative and significant impact on a firm’s credit risk. This
result, too, is consistent with the theory prediction (Diamond, 1991).

Output gap and the customer expectation index are found to have a negative and
significant impact on a firm’s credit risk. This result is consistent with, and supports, the
theory (Fridson et al., 1997; Ferri, 2002). The analysis also found that yield curve is
positively but insignificantly related to a firm’s credit risk. This finding is not consistent
with the theory (Fridson et al., 1997; Ferri, 2002). The reason could be the data we used is
not appropriate. Another important finding is that ratio of total liabilities to total assets in
firms with government monopoly is found to have a negative and significant impact on

69

firm’s credit risk. This finding is consistent with the prior research (Wang, 2008). Wang
(2008) states that with a strengthened banking regulatory environment, more and more
banks compete for the firms with government monopoly which is considered as never
default, and these firms take advantage of this competition to get more loans from banks,
as a result, in the firms with government monopoly, credit risk is

associated with high

total liability/ total asset.

The results also suggested that the changes to the banking regulatory system in 2004
strengthened the relationship between credit risk and loan characteristics. This is consistent
with the banking regulatory guideline (CBRC, 2004, no.19).

7.3 Implications of the Results
The study has significant implications for the development of a comprehensive theory for
credit risk. The study of the impact of loan characteristics on credit risk according to a
framework derived from the literature is an attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis,
and a useful empirical test, of the influence of loan characteristics on credit risk.

The findings of this study have important implications for both researchers and investors.
For example, the findings can be used to evaluate investments and predict firmsʹ default
risk. Also, the findings of this study have important implications for banks, as they can be
used to build a credit risk model to assess credit risk. For example, the significance of
loan‐characteristics variables and banking regulatory variables raises the importance of

70

including loan‐ and regulatory‐characteristics variables in credit‐risk modeling.

Also, the current study demonstrated that much of the existing theoretical literature on
credit risk can be applied to emerging markets, more specifically China. Most of the factors
that were found to be significant in credit risk in developed markets are also found to be
significant in emerging markets.

The results illustrated in Chapter 6 showed that credit risk is correlated with loan factors
such as collateral and loan‐term structure. Beyond this, the study also showed how
changes to the banking regulatory system affect the relationship between loan
characteristics and credit risk. For example, with the enforcement of the new banking
regulatory system, the borrower’s credit risk is increasingly related to its long‐term loan
proposition.

Similarly, macro economic variables were found to be an important determinant of credit
risk. The results imply that existing theory (Fridson et al., 1997; Ferri, 2002) could
satisfactorily explain the relationship between credit risk and macroeconomic factors in
both developed and developing countries. Finally, the literature suggested that the firm’s
accounting information (such as total liability / total asset, and EBITA) is an important
determinant of credit risk in developed markets, such as the US and the UK. In the Chinese
case, these variables also seem to be very important in determining corporate performance
and default risk.
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Our findings are broadly consistent with other studies from emerging markets of
determinants of credit risk. However, the banking regulatory system in China is changing.
The finding that changes to the banking regulatory system is an important factor that
affects the relationship between credit risk and its determinants deserves further research
and evidence from other developing countries that have changed their banking regulatory
systems.

7.4 Limitations of the Study
Although this study is a comprehensive study investigating the relationship between credit
risk and loan characteristics, certain limitations still exist in this study. These limitations
arise because we investigate the impact of banking regulatory guidelines issued by CBRC
only. We only set dummy variable to capture the impact of the establishment of CBRC and
the Guidelines (CBRC, 2004, no.19) issued in 2004. However, in 2005 CBRC issued
Guidelines ( CBRC,2005, no.18) to guide the bank credit policy, which could have some
impact on the relationship between borrowerʹs credit risk and borrowerʹs loan
characteristics, although these guidelines (CBRC,2005. no.18 ) do not directly refer to the
borrowerʹs loan characteristics.

The second limitation is related to the various proxy variables used in the study. For
example, there are some variables in the theoretical models that refer to future values that
cannot be measured directly such as output gap. Even though the proxy variables used in
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our study were defined theoretically and empirically, they still do not completely reflect
the theoretical intention.

7.5 Areas for Future Research
This study examined the relationship between credit risk and loan characteristics in
emerging markets using China as a case study. Based on the findings of this study, one
avenue for future research is to extend the investigation of this relationship to other
emerging markets, more specifically those in the Southeast Asia and Japan, as they have
similar characteristics (Zhang, 2008). Another area of further research is to replicate the
studies in emerging markets by using a large and comprehensive sample which includes
both listed and non‐listed firms, as most of the prior studies in these markets have a small
sample which only includes either listed firms or non‐listed firms, but not both.

Also, further research could be conducted to make a comparison study between developed
and developing countries to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship
between credit risk and loan characteristics. The motivation for other research could be to
build a credit‐risk model using the significant factors explored in this study.
Also, in this research, we only investigate the relationship between credit risk and
borrower’s collateral and loan‐term structure. Actually, interest rate is also an important
loan characteristic related to credit risk (Cressy, 2001). In future research, it could be an
important topic to investigate the relationship between interest rate and credit risk in the
context of new changes to a countryʹs banking regulatory system.
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APPENDIX‐Guidelines on Due Diligence in the Credit Extension
Work of Commercial Banks
Chapter I General Provisions

Article 1 The present Guidelines are formulated in accordance with the “Law of the
People’s Republic of China on Commercial Banks”, the “Law of the People’s Republic
of China on Banking Regulation”, the “General Rules on Loans” and other laws and
regulations for the purpose of promoting the prudential business operation of
commercial banks, further improving the credit extension work mechanism, regulating
the management of extended credits, and clarifying the requirements on due diligence
in the credit extension work.

Article 2 The term credit extension as mentioned in the present Guidelines shall refer to
the on‐balance‐sheet and off‐balance‐sheet credit extension to non‐natural person
customers. The on‐balance‐sheet credit extension includes loans, project financing,
trade financing, discount, overdraft, tally, inter‐bank lending and repurchase, etc.;
while the off‐balance‐sheet credit extension includes loan commitment, suretyship,
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letter of credit, and acceptance of instruments, etc.
Credit extension may be divided by term into short‐term credit extension and medium
and long‐term credit extension. The short‐term credit extension shall refer to the credit
extension of not more than one year, while the medium and long‐term credit extension
shall refer to the credit extension of more than one year.

Article 3 In the present Guidelines, such expressions as credit extension work, credit
extension staff, due diligence in the credit extension work, and due diligence
investigation of the credit extension work shall have their respective meanings as
follows:

(1) The expression credit extension work shall refer to the various credit extension
business activities of commercial banks, including customer investigation, handling of
the business, analysis and appraisal, credit extension decision making and
implementation, post‐credit‐extension management, and management of problematic
credits.

(2) The expression credit extension staff shall refer to the relevant employees of
commercial banks who participate in the credit extension work.

(3) The expression due diligence in the credit extension work shall mean that the credit
extension staff of a commercial bank have fulfilled the basic due diligence requirements
in accordance with the present Guidelines.
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(4) The expression due diligence investigation of the credit extension work shall refer to
the independent verification, appraisal and report made by the due diligence
investigators of the credit extension work of the head office or branch of a commercial
bank about the credit extension staff.

Article 4 With respect to the customer credit extension business for which an associated
party as prescribed in the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Commercial
Banks” applies, the credit extension staff shall apply for withdrawal.

Article 5 A commercial bank shall establish a strict system for vertical management of
credit extension risks, and manage the credit extension in a uniform way.

Article 6 A commercial bank shall establish entire credit extension policies, decision
making mechanism, management information system and uniform credit extension
operation procedures, clarify the requirements on due diligence, as well as assess and
amend the rules on credit extension business in time at regular intervals or when the
relevant laws or regulations are changed.

Article 7 A commercial bank shall create a good credit extension work environment,
clarify the requirements on credit extension risk control to the credit extension staff in
various effective methods and ways, so that they may be familiar with the credit
extension work duties and the due diligence requirements, continuously enhance their
capacity in the credit extension work, and perform their duties independently.
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Article 8 A commercial bank shall strengthen its management of the credit extension
archives, record the rights, obligations, covenants, various forms of transactions, and
breach and correction action between the borrower and the lender, and shall keep them
properly.

Article 9 A commercial bank shall establish a responsibility system for due diligence in
the credit extension work, clarify the duties of each credit extension department and
position, ascertain the liabilities for the credit extension risks caused due to violation of
any law or rule, and punish the relevant persons held liable in accordance with the
legal provisions.

Article 10 The “Appendix” of the present Guidelines enumerates the relevant risk
reminders, and each commercial bank shall formulate relevant risk prevention
requirements in light of the actual situation and with reference to those reminders.

Chapter II Customer Investigation and Due Diligence Requirements for Handling
the Business

Article 11 A commercial bank shall, according to the business development planning
and risk strategy it has determined, draft clear targeted customers, including the
customers with whom it has established business relations and the potential customers.

Article 12 A commercial bank shall, when determining targeted customers, clarify the
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features of the expected customers, and determine the basic requirements for the
customers whose business may be accepted. All customers whose business is accepted
by the commercial bank must generally satisfy or be higher than these requirements.

Article 13 A commercial bank shall, in its customer investigation, collect the basic
information of customers and establish customer archives according to the credit
extension types. For information list reminder, please see the “Reminder of Basic
Information of Customers” in the “Appendix”.

Article 14 A commercial bank shall pay attention to and collect the relevant information
on group customers and associated customers, and effectively identify the centralized
credit extension risks and the associated customers’ credit extension risks.

Article 15 A commercial bank shall carefully verify the legality, authenticity and
validity of the identity certificate provided by the customer, the qualification as a credit
receiver, its financial conditions, etc., and shall record the process and result of
verification in writing.

Article 16 A commercial bank shall investigate customers and verify the customer
information mainly by on‐site investigation, with indirect investigation as the
supplement. When necessary, it may verify the authenticity of the customer
information via an external credit institution.

Article 17 A commercial bank shall, according to the specific circumstance and on its
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own initiative, ask for relevant information from the relevant government departments
and public intermediary institutions, so as to verify the authenticity of the materials
provided by customers, and keep such information in archives.

Article 18 Where the customer information is changed in any way, the commercial
bank shall require the customer to provide a written report, and record the information
anew in archives after further verification.

Article 19 When supplementing or modifying customer information, the credit
extension staff shall communicate with each other on their own initiative, and
guarantee that each party be able to get the relevant information in time.

When a credit extension staff member either of the credit extension department or of a
credit extension management department needs to make supplements to the customer
information, he must notify the opposite party, provided that the matter shall generally
be handled by the former.

Article 20 A commercial bank shall know about and grasp the management conditions
of the customers, urge them to continuously increase management benefits, and
guarantee the credit extension safety.

Article 21 When a customer meets with an emergent incident, the commercial bank
shall immediately send persons to make an on‐site investigation, who shall legally and
timely render their opinions on whether to modify the original credit extension
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information or not. When necessary, the credit extension management department
shall timely send persons jointly with the credit extension department to make the
on‐site investigation.

Article 22 A commercial bank shall urge its credit extension management department
to establish a mutual communication mechanism with other commercial banks
regarding the entirety and authenticity of the customer investigation information. The
credit extension staff shall keep confidential the credit extension information got from
other commercial banks, and shall not use it for unfair competition.

Chapter III Analysis and Appraisal of the Due Diligence Requirements

Article 23 A commercial bank shall, according to the features of different credit
extension varieties, analyze and appraise the credit extension business for which the
customer applies, and shall focus on the factors that might affect the safety of credit
extension, and effectively identify various risks. For the risk reminder of the main
credit extension varieties, please see the “Risk Analysis Reminder of Main Credit
Extension Varieties” in the “Appendix”.

Article 24 A commercial bank shall carefully evaluate the customer’s financial
statements, analyze and appraise the various factors affecting the customer’s financial
conditions, and forecast the customer’s future financial and management conditions.
When necessary, it shall make sensitivity analysis in respect of the interest rate and
exchange rate, etc.
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Article 25 A commercial bank shall analyze and appraise the customer’s non‐financial
factors, identify the customer’s risks in respect of corporate governance, qualities of the
management team, contract performance records, production equipment, technical
capacity, product, market, industry features, and macro‐ economic environment, etc..
For the risk reminder, please see the “Risk Analysis Reminder of Non‐financial
Factors” in the “Appendix”.

Article 26 A commercial bank shall rate and record the customers’ credits. When
necessary, it may entrust an independent and eligible external rating institution with
high credit standing to finish the work.

Article 27 A commercial bank shall, in accordance with the laws, regulations, relevant
guidelines and policies of the state, as well as its own credit rules, assess the feasibility
of the techniques, market and accounting, etc. of the credit extension projects, and
make written records on the assessment.

Article 28 A commercial bank shall analyze and appraise the second source of
repayment, confirm the surety’s suretyship qualification and joint repayment capacity,
as well as the legality, sufficiency and realizability of the mortgage and pledge.

Article 29 A commercial bank shall, according to the credit extension analysis and
appraisal result at each stage, form a written analysis and appraisal report.

The analysis and appraisal report shall indicate in details the conditions on the
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customer’s business operation and management, its financial conditions, the situation
on the industry and the environment, etc., with the contents to be authentic, concise
and clear. After the analysis and appraisal report is announced, it shall not be modified
in general on the basis of the original version. If it really needs to be modified in
general, the explanation thereof shall be attached separately.

Article 30 With respect to the major events that occur within the valid term of the
customer’s credit rate or a customer appraisal report and affect the customer’s credit
standing, the commercial bank shall make the credit extension analysis and appraisal
anew. The major events include the following:

(1) The external policies are changed;

(2) The customer’s organizational structure, stock rights or the principal leader is
changed;

(3) The customer’s guaranty exceeds the established alert level for guaranty;

(4) The customer’s capacity of financial income and expenditure is greatly changed;

(5) The customer is involved in a major lawsuit;

(6) The customer has historical records on cross default to another bank; and

(7) Other major events.

Article 31 A commercial bank shall, at any time, examine the customer’s appraisal
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report which has been changed or whose credit rate has been invalidated, and render
corresponding assessment opinions in time.

Chapter IV Due Diligence Requirements for Credit Extension Decision Making and
Implementation

Article 32 A commercial bank shall make decisions on credit extension within the scope
of written authorization, and shall not extend credits by going beyond its powers.

Article 33 A commercial bank shall make decisions on credit extension pursuant to the
prescribed procedures, and shall not extend credits by violating or simplifying the
procedures.

Article 34 A commercial bank shall, in the process of credit extension decision making,
strictly require the credit extension staff to comply with the principles of objectivity
and impartiality, and independently render their decision making opinions without
being disturbed by any external factor.

Article 35 A commercial bank shall not extend credit to the business for any of the
following uses:

(1) product or project prohibited by the state by explicit order;

(2) equity capital investment in violation of the relevant provisions of the state, or
verification or increase of the registered capital composed of only the extended credits;
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(3) investment in the form of stocks, futures, or financial derivative products, etc. in
violation of the relevant provisions of the state; and

(4) other projects in violation of any law, regulation or policy of the state.

Article 36 Where a customer fails to obtain any of the following effective approval
documents in accordance with the provisions of the state, or obtains the documents by
dividing the project into several parts, or the approval is granted in excess of power
directly or in a disguised form or beyond authorization, the commercial bank shall not
extend credits to it:

(1) project approval documents;

(2) environmental protection approval documents;

(3) land approval documents; and

(4) other necessary approval documents as required by the legal provisions of the state.

Article 37 Where, after a commercial bank has made a decision on credit extension, the
conditions for credit extension are modified, the commercial bank shall make a new
decision or modify the credit extension in accordance with the relevant laws,
regulations or corresponding contractual clauses.

Article 38 A commercial bank shall, when extending condition‐based credits, comply
with the principle of “creating conditions before extending credit”, and shall not extend
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the credits before creating the conditions for credit extension or making a new decision
on the modified conditions.

Article 39 A commercial bank shall make corresponding legal documents on the credits
it intends to extend, and shall check the legality and regularity of such legal
documents. For the reminder of the main clauses of the legal documents, please see the
“Reminder of the Main Clauses of a Standard Form Contract” in the

Article 40 A commercial bank shall, when extending a credit, pay attention to the
legality of the loan contract. The credit extension staff member who is authorized to
sign the loan contract shall, before signing his name, examine the contents of the loan
contract item by item, and confirm the customer’s exact legal name, authorization proof
document of the customer’s authorized signatory, the identity of the signatory on
behalf of the customer, and the legality of the signed legal documents on credit
extension.

Chapter V Due Diligence Requirements for Post‐credit‐extension Management and
Problematic Credits Settlement

Article 41 A commercial bank shall, after extending a credit, continuously monitor all
the factors possible to affect the repayment, and shall form a written monitoring report.
The commercial bank shall focus on monitoring the following contents:

(1) whether the customer uses the extended credit for the purpose set forth in the
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contract, and whether it performs the contract fully and honestly;

(2) whether the project under credit extension is carried out normally;

(3) whether the customer’s legal status is changed;

(4) whether the customer’s financial conditions are changed;

(5) the information on repayment of the extended credit; and

(6) the information on the acquirability of the mortgaged property and on the quality
and value, etc.

Article 42 A commercial bank shall, in strict accordance with the principles for risk
management, accurately classify the extended credits, and establish a system on
reporting the changes of the customer’s information.

Article 43 A commercial bank shall, through off‐site or on‐site inspections, find the
potential risks of the credit receiver in time and send a pre‐warning risk reminder. For
risk reminder, please see the “Risk Reminder of Pre‐warning Signals” in the
“Appendix”. The credit extension staff shall timely analyze the credit extension, and
shall, once finding the customer’s breach, timely stop it and take remedial measures.

Article 44 A commercial bank shall, according to the customer’s repayment capacity
and cash flow, make adjustments on the credit extended to the customer, including
renewal, collateral requirement, increase or decrease of the credit amount. The
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commercial bank shall also require the borrower to make repayment in advance, and
decide on whether to enumerate this sum of credit on the watch list or include it into
problematic credits or not.

Article 45 A commercial bank shall establish clear indices on the credits enumerated on
the watch list, further observe and determine whether to delete this sum of credit from
the watch list or degrade it, and shall appoint special persons to manage the
problematic credits.

Article 46 A commercial bank shall take the following measures against problematic
credits:

(1) Confirming the actual credit balance;

(2) Re‐checking all the credit extension documents, and soliciting opinions from experts
in the areas of law, audit and management of problematic credits;

(3) Terminating the unimplemented credit line according to the covenants and
provisions. If it is difficult to be terminated in accordance with the law or the
termination causes any difficulty in the customer’s business operation, the commercial
bank shall open a special account for management of the unimplemented credit line,
and shall not use it without approval of the authorized department;

(4) Notifying in written form all branches that might be affected, and requiring them to
make commitments on effecting the necessary measures;
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(5) Requiring the surety to perform the suretyship obligations, and adding guaranty or
exercising the right of guaranty;

(6) Applying to the local judicial department for freezing the deposit accounts of the
customers with problematic credits so as to reduce the losses; and

(7) Other necessary measures.

Chapter VI Requirements for Due Diligence Investigation of the Credit Extension Work

Article 47 A commercial bank shall establish positions for independent due diligence
investigation of the credit extension work, and clarify the position‐related duties and
work requirements.

The due diligence investigators of credit extension shall have sound knowledge on
credit extension, law and accounting, etc., accept relevant trainings, and carry out the
work in compliance with the principles of honesty, credibility and impartiality.

Article 48 A commercial bank shall support the due diligence investigators of the credit
extension work to independently exercise the due diligence investigation functions,
and the investigation may be made either on site or off site. When necessary, the
commercial bank may retain external experts or entrust a professional institution to
carry out certain due diligence investigation on borrowers.

Source: China Banking Regulatory Commission, 2004.
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